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INTRODUCTION
Given that judicial review involves the unelected branch of 
government overturning lawmaking by the elected branches, it is 
understandable that scholars see the problem primarily as one of 
determining the appropriate allocations of governmental power. 
However, in emphasizing the political implications of judicial 
review, scholars have largely overlooked an important process 
consideration—the extent to which enlarging aggrieved persons’ 
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access to courts simultaneously diminishes the meaningfulness of 
their participation as litigants. As this analysis makes clear, robust 
judicial review threatens not only to tip the political balance of 
power too far in favor of courts over the other governmental 
branches, but also to tip the balance of power within judicial decision 
making too far in favor of judges over party-litigants. Thus, even as 
greater numbers of controversies reach the courthouse under a more 
expansive regime of justiciable review, the meaningfulness of the 
party-litigants’ participation, once there, may be significantly 
diminished. This Article explains the nature and sources of this 
threatened diminishment and the ways that the rules governing 
justiciability and the application of different levels of judicial 
scrutiny help to check these tendencies.
To understand how justiciability requirements and different 
levels of scrutiny enhance party-litigants’ opportunities to participate 
in the process of judicial review, it will be necessary to start with the 
basics. The American justice system assures party-litigants not only 
fair access to the courthouse, but also the opportunity, once there, to 
participate in the decision process of a disinterested tribunal by 
making factual proofs, invoking legal norms, and insisting on 
favorable outcomes as matters of right.1 For such participation to be 
meaningful, litigants must be able to rely on legal norms that are 
sufficiently specific to require courts, depending on relevant findings 
of fact, to reach particular outcomes. Thus, courts must generally 
avoid trying to solve complex social coordination problems under 
vague fairness and reasonableness standards. Solving such problems 
on a case-by-case basis threatens to leave too much to the discretion 
of judges in the sense that the norms do not require—or sometimes 
even suggest—particular outcomes, thereby diminishing the notion 
that party-litigants are entitled to favorable outcomes as a matter of 
right and transforming them into supplicants begging for judicial 
1. On the right of access, see Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277, 280 
(1876) (stating that the right to be heard is “founded in the first principles of natural 
justice” (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 
817, 828 (1977); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES § 10.9, at 931-32 (4th ed. 2011). On the right to participate, see Lon L. 
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 (1978) 
(“[T]he distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it confers on 
the affected party a peculiar form of participation in the decision, that of presenting 
proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor.”). While both sides argue 
they are entitled to favorable outcomes, obviously both sides cannot prevail. Who 
prevails is a function of which side’s proofs and norms are embraced by the tribunal. 
See id. at 369.
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empathy.2 The objective, of course, is to strike the proper balance. 
Even a fairly specific rule requires courts to exercise some 
discretion, and even a fairly vague standard can serve to point courts 
in the appropriate general direction.3
In connection with robust judicial review, which tempts courts 
to rely on vague reasonableness standards, the requirements of 
justiciability and the different levels of scrutiny help to curb 
tendencies for courts to exercise broad discretion by introducing 
relative specificity into the applicable legal norms. Of course, in 
those instances in which rule formality threatens to bar recovery, 
plaintiffs would understandably prefer being heard as beggars under 
vague standards to not being heard at all. In those contexts it is 
defendants who benefit as a practical matter from receiving 
meaningful opportunities to raise principled defenses. However, in 
other circumstances the tables will be turned—rule formality helps 
plaintiffs to avoid frivolous defenses that might be available in a 
more discretion-based system of judicial review.4 And from a 
broader perspective, the formality introduced by rules such as those 
governing justiciability and the different levels of scrutiny avoids the 
transparent sham of judges listening to arguments that they do not 
feel bound to take seriously, thus helping the judicial system fulfill 
2. In this context, Lon Fuller invokes the hypothetical of an employee 
asking for an increase in pay. Fuller, supra note 1, at 369-70. In the absence of any 
specific normative basis to assert a right to the increase and needing the boss to 
exercise his discretion favorably, the employee is left to “merely beg for generosity, 
urging the needs of his family.” Id. at 369. It will be observed that the concept of 
entitlement invoked here is not synonymous with being entitled to an outcome as a 
matter of law. This Article and Fuller’s analysis use “entitlement” with respect to 
substantive rights, which may or may not necessitate an argument to the trier(s) of 
fact. Id. at 369-70. The “matter of law” notion is a narrower subset, indicating that 
the party in question is procedurally entitled to a favorable ruling on assumed, 
admitted, determined, or undisputed facts, without any assistance from the trier(s) of 
fact. 
3. The objective reflected in the case law governing judicial review is not 
to reduce the exercise of judicial discretion at all costs. A general rule barring 
judicial review altogether would prevent plaintiffs from participating as beggars, but 
such a bar would be unacceptable according to traditional thinking. See Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
1, §§ 2.1-2.2, at 32-48.
4. For example, when the claim rests on allegations of race-based 
governmental discrimination to which strict scrutiny applies, traditionally the 
plaintiff enjoys a strong presumption in his favor. See infra text accompanying note 
191; see also infra text accompanying notes 248-54 (referring to the possibility of 
strict scrutiny in connection with gender-based classifications). 
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its high-profile commitment to delivering principled, impartial 
justice.5
This Article is mainly descriptive and analytical. It does not 
argue, based on first principles, that a legal system must allow 
litigants to participate in the manner described or that there must be 
litigants, or courts for that matter,6 or that all of these constraining 
features are necessarily part of what is meant by “procedural due 
process” in Article III.7 Instead, the analysis begins by observing that 
the American system does in fact provide for courts8 and does in fact 
make assurances of party-litigant participation of the sort just 
described.9 Given these commitments, internal logic requires that 
courts craft the instrumental means by which to deliver on them.10
Working from a perspective largely overlooked by constitutional 
scholars, this Article examines two important doctrines by which the 
judicial review process endeavors to accomplish this task. Anyone 
prescribing reform in connection with these doctrines—the analysis 
5. As the discussions that follow make clear, this is the way judges most 
often refer to the process concerns that lie at the heart of this Article’s analysis. 
However, because “principled, impartial justice” necessarily involves litigants’ 
meaningful participation in the decision process, see supra text accompanying note 
1, and judges may reasonably be assumed to appreciate that reality, this Article will 
continue to refer to “litigants’ opportunities to participate” and “principled 
adjudication” interchangeably.
6. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1-9 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). Every complex society must have 
institutionalized procedures for resolving issues of general concern, but “[t]he 
institutions which can be devised for the settlement of social questions vary 
endlessly.” Id. at 5.
7. U.S. CONST. art. III. The Supreme Court has held that some of the 
constraining features discussed in this Article are rooted in Article III. See Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968) (holding that the rule against advisory opinions is 
required by Article III); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 2.3, at 48-49. 
Regarding the requirements of procedural due process, see generally id. §§ 7.1-7.4, 
at 557-619.
8. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Whether Section 1 requires some lower 
federal courts is controversial. See Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to 
Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 532-33 (1974) 
(arguing lower courts are constitutionally required); Gerald Gunther, Congressional 
Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing 
Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 916 (1984).
9. See supra text accompanying note 1.
10. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 621, 630 (2002) (arguing that instrumental means are compatible 
with noninstrumental ends as long as they are conceptually sequenced so that the 
former give way when the two come into conflict).
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uses affirmative action and gender classification, among others, as 
specific examples—should take into account the realities described 
in this Article.
Justiciability and different levels of scrutiny, the main foci of 
this analysis, are not the only features of judicial review that aim to 
ensure meaningful party-litigant participation. Recent Supreme Court 
decisions recognize infringements of parties’ rights to participate in 
the contexts of class actions and arbitration agreements,11 and reflect 
concern over the unfairness generated by severe asymmetries in 
litigants’ resources.12 To be sure, normative considerations related to 
law’s ultimate ends may overcome the means-to-the-ends process 
considerations identified here. For example, if a formal rule of equal 
protection condemning all forms of race-based classification were to 
threaten to invalidate important affirmative action initiatives, then 
the formal strict scrutiny rule might be required to give way to a 
more flexible standard of equality.13 The important point, largely 
overlooked by constitutional scholars, is that moving to general 
reasonableness standards and choosing to address many-centered 
social design problems on a case-by-case basis to some extent 
reneges on the traditional promises of principled decision making 
and meaningful litigant participation. The burden should be on those 
who advocate judicial review under vague standards to explain why 
the accompanying diminishments of litigants’ opportunities to 
participate are warranted. For all the attention that topics like 
standing to sue and levels of scrutiny have received in the law 
11. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750-52 
(2011) (holding class arbitrations unfair); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 
2541, 2556-58 (2011) (holding class action procedures unfair to both sides). See 
generally Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. 
Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 
(2011).
12. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (holding that it may 
be unfair to incarcerate a person for civil contempt without the government 
providing a lawyer).
13. For arguments to this effect, see generally Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking 
Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and 
Reparations, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 683 (2004); Richard Lempert, The Force of Irony: 
On the Morality of Affirmative Action and United Steelworkers v. Weber, 95 ETHICS
86 (1984). Engaging in this balancing would require courts to exercise the sort of 
discretion that diminishes litigants’ rights to participate. But these would be special 
instances and many of them would, by means of the incremental common-law 
process, eventually produce relatively specific rules of decision. See infra text
accompanying notes 58-62.
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journals,14 this Article is the first to examine them from the 
perspective of preserving litigants’ opportunities for meaningful 
participation in the process of judicial review. 
Part I provides an overview of law as a problem-solving 
enterprise and describes how adjudication affords party-litigants the 
opportunity to offer proofs and to invoke norms that enable them to 
insist on, not simply to beg for, favorable outcomes. Drawing 
analogies from traditional tort and contract law, Part I shows how 
courts have traditionally relied on two overlapping methodologies: 
first, excluding from review formally identified categories of 
complex, many-centered social design problems that are 
institutionally unsuitable for courts to solve; and second, regarding 
design problems that courts agree to review, relying on relatively 
specific legal norms that support meaningful litigant participation. 
Turning to examine the law governing judicial review, Part II 
considers the first of these methodologies, reflected in the 
requirements of justiciability—formal rules that exclude certain 
categories of complex design problems that, if courts engaged in 
reasonableness-based review, would not only intrude on the political 
prerogatives of the other branches, but also interfere with the 
opportunities of litigants to engage in the decision process. Critics 
who favor expansion of aggrieved persons’ access to courts have 
attacked these curbs on expansive judicial review. This Article sheds 
new light on the debate. Part III examines limitations on judicial 
review within the second methodology—limitations that aim to 
ensure meaningful litigant participation in judicial review by 
maintaining sufficient rule-specificity through the application of 
different levels of judicial scrutiny. This analysis includes two 
subject areas—affirmative action and gender-based classification—
that are particularly confusing and controversial, explaining how the 
system got to its present state and where it may be going from here. 
14. See generally, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea 
for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977) (standing); Lea Brilmayer, The 
Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or Controversy” 
Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979) (standing); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of 
Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of 
Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1984) (standing); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond 
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) (levels of scrutiny); Jeffrey M. 
Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny,
45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161 (1984) (levels of scrutiny).
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I. EXCLUDING COMPLEX, MANY-CENTERED CONTROVERSIES AND 
MAINTAINING RULE-SPECIFICITY HELP PRESERVE 
PARTY-LITIGANTS’ RIGHTS TO PARTICIPATE
A. A Legal System Is Usefully Conceived as a Problem-Solving 
Enterprise
Whether or not one characterizes the ends sought to be 
achieved by a legal system in instrumental terms, the means by 
which the system sets about to achieve these ends have an 
instrumental, problem-solving character.15 For example, if a system’s 
noninstrumental objective of achieving justice requires that 
convicted criminals suffer governmentally inflicted punishment, 
establishing the means of carrying out officially sanctioned criminal 
sentences requires that practical problems be solved instrumentally 
and that solutions be implemented. The noninstrumental goal of 
achieving justice guides that process and is the ultimate arbiter, but 
instrumental problem solving is unavoidable.16 Thus, preliminary 
questions regarding problem solving must be answered in connection 
with every legal system: What, exactly, are problems? What 
constitute solutions? What sorts of actors, using what sorts of 
methodologies, are the most effective problem solvers?
A problem exists when an actor, including a legal institution, 
“realizes that an obstacle is preventing [the attainment of an] 
objective and that an effective response strategy, [although 
presumably possible,] is not immediately apparent.”17 The problem 
resides not in the obstacle, as such, but in the perceived lack of an 
effective response strategy. One solves a problem by designing an 
effective strategy or “game plan” by which to remove the obstacle.18
15. Two recent articles, both focusing on private-law subjects, develop the 
basic principles that support this Article’s public-law application of limits-of-
adjudication theory. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Contract’s Constitutive 
Core: Solving Problems by Making Deals, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 89 [hereinafter 
Henderson, Contract’s Constitutive Core]; James A. Henderson, Jr., The 
Constitutive Dimensions of Tort: Promoting Private Solutions to Risk-Management 
Problems, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 221 (2013) [hereinafter Henderson, The 
Constitutive Dimensions of Tort].
16. Cf. supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
17. Henderson, The Constitutive Dimensions of Tort, supra note 15, at 224.
18. One implements a solution by using it to eliminate the obstacle or by 
persuading a more effective implementer to adopt the solution as its own. 
Henderson, Contract’s Constitutive Core, supra note 15, at 102. For development of 
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A problem’s difficulty is a function of the number of variables that 
must be considered in achieving a solution and their mutual 
interdependence.19 Variables are interdependent to the extent that 
considering any one requires the concurrent consideration of many, 
or most, of the others. For example, designing the appropriate 
capacity of an automobile’s gas tank depends on the designs of other 
relevant variables, including (to name a few) the gas mileage of the 
vehicle, its overall weight and weight-distribution, the space 
available for the tank, and safety considerations. And each of these 
variables depends on all the others—redesigning the gas tank to 
make it larger in order to compensate for low gas mileage lowers the 
mileage still further by adding weight to the vehicle, which affects 
handling and thus safety, and so on. Problems that require 
consideration of interdependent variables are often referred to as 
many-centered or polycentric.20 Examples include designing a 
complicated machine,21 a complex of buildings,22 or a governmental 
institution.23 Regarding the last of these examples, problems 
requiring governmental planning and design are commonly referred 
to as social coordination problems.24
By contrast to polycentric problems, unicentric problems 
present more-versus-less judgmental tasks—typically, determining 
the magnitude of sequential variables arranged along linear axes. 
Although assessment of subsequent variables may depend on 
assessments of previous variables, one may consider each as a 
separate subproblem, solving each before moving to the next. Thus, 
if a problem consists of calculating the load-bearing capacity of a 
structure and a number of components contribute to the overall 
capacity, the problem is unicentric if each component’s capacity may 
the thesis that legal activity is social planning, see SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 195-
204 (2011).
19. Henderson, Contract’s Constitutive Core, supra note 15, at 100.
20. See Fuller, supra note 1, at 394-404.
21. For an application of the concept of polycentricity to a complex product 
design, see Henderson, The Constitutive Dimensions of Tort, supra note 15, at 224.
22. For an application of the concept of polycentricity to an architect 
designing a school building complex, see Henderson, Contract’s Constitutive Core,
supra note 15, at 106-07 (citing DONALD A. SCHÖN, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER:
HOW PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION 79-104 (1983)).
23. For applications of the concept of polycentricity to governmental 
welfare and school funding programs, see infra text accompanying notes 170-182.
24. See Henderson, Contract’s Constitutive Core, supra note 15, at 91 
(“[L]aw consists of officially derived solutions to the persistent problem of 
coordinating human conduct . . . .”).
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be determined. Such a problem may be difficult to solve, but is not 
polycentric.25
Because solving a complex, many-centered problem in the 
absence of specific design standards forces the decision maker to 
rely on experience-based intuition and to perform creative leaps of 
judgment that simultaneously bring all of the interconnected 
elements into consideration,26 only single individuals or small 
handfuls of like-minded collaborators are capable of solving highly 
polycentric problems.27 The paradigm here is the architect who, 
acting alone, creates complex designs “of a whole,” relying on 
instinct informed by experience. Larger groups of individuals, when 
they attempt to collaborate to solve such problems, usually cannot 
combine effectively to make the necessary intuitive leaps, and 
therefore must delegate such problem-solving tasks to single 
individuals or very small groups.28 Lest the misimpression be created 
that a problem is either unicentric or polycentric, it must be 
understood that polycentricity is “a matter of degree.”29 Most 
problems of any complexity present a combination of unicentric and 
polycentric aspects.
Each branch of the federal government, including the judiciary 
upon which this Article focuses, possesses unique problem-solving 
and solution-implementing capabilities. In this regard, the 
capabilities of the federal executive office are substantial. The 
President exercises executive power individually, and the problem-
solving groups comprised of White House advisers are small and 
like-minded.30 The extrinsic normative constraints on the executive’s 
capabilities chiefly take the form of explicit constitutional limits on 
25. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufactuerers’ 
Conscious Design Choices: The Limit of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 
1535 (1973). 
26. When the applicable law consists of specific design standards, the 
standards contain the solution. In that event the court does not solve the problem but 
rather implements the pre-existing solutions reflected in the legal standards. See
infra text accompanying note 50.
27. Henderson, Contract’s Constitutive Core, supra note 15, at 103; see 
also Gary Klein, Insight, in THINKING: THE NEW SCIENCE OF DECISION-MAKING,
PROBLEM-SOLVING, AND PREDICTION 193, 207 (John Brockman ed., 2013).
28. Cf. supra note 18 and accompanying text (suggesting that individuals 
who have reached solutions often seek help from larger actors for implementation). 
In mirror image fashion, here larger actors seek help from individuals to reach 
solutions.
29. See Fuller, supra note 1, at 397.
30. For a brief overview of the problem-solving capacities of the federal 
executive, see Henderson, Contract’s Constitutive Core, supra note 15, at 113-14.
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the President’s power to make law.31 Article II grants the President 
authority to act officially only in defined areas32 and authorizes the 
President to implement solutions by issuing executive orders and 
other edicts that carry the force of law.33 No doubt reflecting the 
executive’s inherent capability to solve many-centered problems, the 
trend has been for Presidents to exercise their direct-action powers 
expansively.34 By contrast to Article II’s limitations on the executive, 
Article I authorizes Congress to make law in sweeping fashion on an 
almost limitless range of subjects.35 Thus, the chief limitations on 
Congress are intrinsic—Congress and its committees are too large to 
act effectively as problem solvers. As a consequence, Congress 
delegates to individuals (including its members) and small groups the 
tasks of formulating proposed legislation and then acts collectively 
(and often ineptly) to implement the proposed solutions by enacting 
some of them into law.36 It follows that, in mirror-opposite fashion to 
the federal executive, Congress is free to make law on almost any 
subject, but is structured to be inherently incapable of doing so very 
effectively.
This Article focuses mainly on the courts and the process of 
judicial review. When assessing the inherent problem-solving 
capabilities of the judiciary, it is important to distinguish between the 
sorts of procedural and evidentiary problems that trial judges solve 
routinely and that only rarely present issues of broad social 
significance, and substantive problems that, when the relevant 
31. Id. at 113.
32. See PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
87-89 (2d ed. 2002). These areas include international affairs, appointments, 
pardons, and vetoes.
33. See PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND 
ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION 21 (2002).
34. See Editorial, Obama Rewrites Obamacare, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2014, 
at A14 (“[T]he Affordable Care Act . . . means whatever President Obama says it 
does . . . . [T]he law is whatever he says it is.”). See generally Kevin Sholette, Note, 
The American Czars, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219 (2010).
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. One of the important limits, of course, reflects 
civil rights of the sort reviewed in this Article. Another limit, until recently believed 
to be moribund, is the Commerce Clause. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 3.3.5, 
at 269-78.
36. The federal legislature seems to have been designed by the framers to 
be clumsily inept. For example, Congress is comprised of two redundant houses, 
both of which must adopt identical versions of proposed legislative solutions. And 
both houses are structured horizontally rather than vertically, empowering individual 
members to impede progress toward implementation by enactment. See RANDALL B.
RIPLEY, CONGRESS: PROCESS AND POLICY 4-10, 141 (3d ed. 1983).
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existing law is inadequate and courts must make new law, present 
complex social coordination problems. The first sort of problems are 
not important to this analysis.37 Regarding the second sort, one may 
assume individuals who serve as federal judges are as inherently 
capable of solving such problems as are the individuals who serve as 
President and White House advisers. To be sure, courts may not seek 
out social problems to solve on their own initiative, and courts 
typically lack the resources to receive and process large quantities of 
data on broad social issues.38 But even with these caveats, federal 
judges as individuals compare favorably with individuals serving in 
the federal executive concerning their problem solving capabilities.39
In any event, even if individual judges are inherently capable 
problem-solvers, Article III imposes significant external constraints 
on the federal judiciary’s lawmaking authority.40 The concerns 
traditionally reflected in debates over the extent to which courts 
should make law fall into two related categories: first, whether, 
because federal judges are not elected, they are adequately 
accountable to the voting public; and second, whether, when courts 
do make law, they intrude excessively on the lawmaking 
prerogatives of the other two branches. The analysis that follows 
delves further into the subject of courts as problem solvers and 
solution implementers, employing both the justiciability doctrines 
and the different levels of scrutiny to show how these external 
constraints on judicial review help not only to achieve substantive 
objectives, but also to ensure litigants’ meaningful participation in 
the judicial review process.
37. Although these problems are often somewhat polycentric and may be 
important to the outcome, given their sheer numbers and the need to achieve rapid 
closure, judges may traditionally exercise broad discretion in solving them. See
KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 184-85 (6th ed. 2006).
38. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 
U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 935-51 (2006). By contrast to the conceptual limits of 
adjudication emphasized in the instant analysis, the limits to which Rachlinski refers 
may be said to be “mechanical” in nature.
39. See Henderson, Contract’s Constitutive Core, supra note 15, at 116 & 
n.137. 
40. One writer has grouped these substantive constraints into two major 
categories: one group authorizes (and, by implication, limits) the federal courts 
regarding the enforcement of the power of the federal government; and the other 
group authorizes federal courts to serve an interstate umpiring function. See 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 2.1, at 34-35.
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B. The American Legal System Traditionally Affords Persons 
Directly Affected by Governmentally Sanctioned Problem-
Solving Processes Opportunities to Participate
The assurance that party-litigants will be allowed to participate 
in the judicial review process is part of a broader pattern that 
permeates the American legal system.41 Thus, members of the public 
affected by the decisions of the federal executive and legislature 
participate through the ballot box42 and lobbying efforts.43 And those 
affected by judicially enforced contracts either participate directly or 
their interests are protected by externally imposed norms.44
Moreover, tort law extends protections to third persons by means of 
liability rules that, while not mandating that would-be victims be 
allowed to participate in the decisions that create risks, force problem 
solvers to take into account the interests of uninvolved bystanders.45
Regarding problem solving and solution implementing by the federal 
judiciary, the opportunity of those most directly affected to 
participate in the decision process comes not through the ballot box 
or the bargaining table, but through involvement as party-litigants.46
Traditionally, the American legal system assures litigants the 
opportunity to participate in the decision process by presenting 
proofs, invoking established norms, and insisting before an impartial 
41. See Fuller, supra note 1, at 363-64.
42. Voters at the federal level do not ordinarily cast ballots for or against 
particular solutions, but rather they vote for candidates who run on platforms partly 
comprised of proposed solutions to problems that the candidates promise, if elected, 
to implement. By contrast, at the state level, one often encounters direct popular 
lawmaking in the form of referenda, recalls, propositions, initiative petitions, and the 
like. See HART & SACKS, supra note 6, at 657. See generally EDWIN M. BACON &
MORRILL WYMAN, DIRECT ELECTIONS AND LAW-MAKING BY POPULAR VOTE (1912). 
43. See BRUCE C. WOLPE & BERTRAM J. LEVINE, LOBBYING CONGRESS:
HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS 1-4 (2d ed. 1996).
44. See generally ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 17-
90, 373-98 (3d ed. 2014).
45. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965) (stating that 
under negligence law, actors must consider risks of harm to others); United States v. 
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (expressing algebraically the 
requirement that an actor must consider risks to others in a landmark decision). 
Interestingly, to avoid liability for intentional torts, an actor often must receive the 
informed consent of his would-be victim—that is, actually involve the other in the 
relevant problem-solving activity. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 95, at 
216-17 (2001).
46. The requirement that only those directly affected—personally injured—
have the requisite standing to bring action is considered as one of the important 
justiciability doctrines. Cf. infra text accompanying note 109.
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tribunal that the norms entitle them to a favorable outcome.47 Section 
I.C, below, examines the manner in which litigants participate, 
identifying the chief obstacles to meaningful participation and the 
ways the American system has traditionally attempted to eliminate 
those obstacles.
C. A Closer Look at Adjudication: Assuring Party-Litigants the 
Right to Participate Requires Courts to Avoid Complex, Many-
Centered Design Problems 
1. Many-Centered Design Problems Present Significant 
Obstacles to Meaningful Litigant Participation
Given that individuals and very small groups are inherently 
capable of solving many-centered design problems by relying on 
experienced-based intuition one might expect, as noted earlier, that 
individual judges or small judicial panels would make competent 
problem solvers.48 However, reflecting the fact that federal judges 
are not elected, Article III and long tradition place external 
normative constraints on judicial lawmaking.49 In addition, the 
adjudicative process employed by courts has internal, institutional 
limits that, perhaps even more than the external political constraints, 
curtail the capabilities of courts to solve problems by making law. 
When courts attempt to solve complex, many-centered problems 
under vague general standards of reasonableness or fairness, they 
must exercise broad discretion in making the necessary leaps of 
creative, integrative judgment. In those circumstances, all that party-
litigants can do by way of “argument” is to suggest how their 
outcomes are generally appropriate and then to entreat judges to 
empathize. 
By contrast, for litigants actually to participate in judicial 
decision making, they must be able to invoke norms that to some 
extent constrain rather than merely empower judges to reach 
appropriate outcomes. For this to be possible, the law must 
disaggregate the interdependent elements of social design problems 
ahead of time and arrange them into logical sequences of essentially 
unicentric issues that allow the litigants to guide tribunals through 
47. See supra text accompanying note 1.
48. See supra text accompanying note 39. See generally WILLIAM 
DOMNARSKI, FEDERAL JUDGES REVEALED (2009).
49. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also supra text accompanying note 40.
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linear chains of reasoning to the appropriate conclusions.50 Thus, 
lawmakers (including courts themselves) must solve major portions 
of complex social coordination problems prior to the litigation that 
relates to such problems, reducing the solutions to unicentric 
sequences of relatively specific references to facts that party-litigants 
must prove at trial.51 If lawmakers have failed to perform this 
disaggregation function in advance, many-centered social design 
problems will remain to be solved under a vague default standard of 
fairness or reasonableness.52 In that event, given the broad discretion 
left to the law applier, litigants will be unable to participate in the 
decision process except by presenting proofs and then entreating the 
tribunals to empathize with them in exercising essentially arbitrary 
powers in their favor. Playing the role of supplicant may constitute 
participation to a limited extent, but it is not meaningful in the sense 
employed in this analysis.53
It might appear that the circumstances confronting a court 
when retrospectively reviewing the reasonableness of an existing 
design are significantly different from those that confront designers 
in the first instance. After all, a designer often must start more or less 
from scratch, whereas the court’s task is the inherently more focused 
one of deciding, ex-post on a yes–no basis, whether or not the 
designer’s choices are reasonable.54 However, for a court to engage 
sensibly in ex-post design review, it must consider and evaluate the 
50. See supra Section I.A.
51. Suppose that a long-standing civil liability rule requires that an actor act 
“reasonably” in defending his home and family from apparent forcible attack. That 
rule would be “depolycentrized” to some degree if, over time, such actions were 
deemed reasonable if, but only if, the attacker reasonably appears to be threatening 
deadly force, the defender actually believes such to be the case, and the defensive 
force used does not exceed what appears to be necessary to stop the attack.
52. For an example of one way that such norms might be particularized at 
trial to fit the facts of a given case, see infra text accompanying notes 84-86. In the 
alternative, the tribunal could simply decide by exercising discretion to reach a 
conclusion one way or the other under the vague reasonableness standard. If the 
court takes this second path, the party-litigants are transformed into supplicants 
seeking empathy instead of advocates demanding outcomes required by the law.
53. See supra text accompanying note 2. In his hypothetical, Fuller refers to 
the absence of a specific rule of entitlement, leaving the employee to “merely beg 
for generosity.” Fuller, supra note 1, at 369; cf. infra text accompanying note 187.
54. Behavioral researchers have shown that no problem solver works “from 
scratch” entirely—individual problem solvers rely on long-term memory for models 
and analogies to previously derived solutions with which to solve seemingly “new” 
design problems. Having drawn from the past, the designer must make a leap into 
the future, but the designer uses past experience as a guide. See Henderson, 
Contract’s Constitutive Core, supra note 15, at 105-07.
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elements of the design much as it might if it were designing a course 
of action ex-ante, and the litigants must address the issues in similar 
fashion.55 The fact that the outcome at trial is expressed in a binary 
format somewhat reduces, but certainly does not eliminate, many-
centeredness.56 As will be explained, doctrinal techniques are 
available that, by marginally comparing actual designs with 
hypothetical alternatives proposed by plaintiffs, reduce the 
difficulties.57 But the fact remains that judging the reasonableness of 
complex designs pushes courts to the limits of their institutional 
capabilities, thereby jeopardizing party-litigants’ opportunities to 
participate meaningfully in the decision process.
To some extent, the foregoing analysis begs the question of 
how, to begin with, courts develop the sorts of formal common law 
rules that subsequently enable litigants to participate meaningfully in 
the process of rule application. One part of an appropriate response is 
that courts do not develop common law “of a whole,” as when an 
experienced individual makes intuitive leaps to solve a many-
centered design problem.58 Instead, courts develop common law 
doctrine gradually and marginally by applying emerging, relatively 
vague legal norms to new fact patterns that typically differ from 
earlier patterns only incrementally.59 Of course, to some extent this 
begs the further question of how common law doctrine ever got 
started to begin with. The writ system that developed in England 
after the Conquest presented the king’s courts with crude (by modern 
55. For a good example of a Supreme Court opinion reflecting an 
understanding of this point, see San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1973) (upholding Texas public school funding plan 
against equal protection attack). Justice Powell, writing for the Court, clearly 
recognizes that to decide whether or not the existing Texas school funding plan is 
acceptable, the Court would be required independently to solve the same many-
centered planning problem that the Texas authorities were required to solve in the 
first instance. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 178-82.
56. The yes-no format reduces the difficulties compared with the 
difficulties of actually coming up with an alternative design in all its details, as 
courts are required to do when drafting injunctive remedies in school desegregation 
litigation. See infra text accompanying notes 197-98. But requiring a yes-no
outcome still leaves the Court with the task of independently reviewing the 
reasonableness of the existing design.
57. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
59. Fuller, supra note 1, at 373; see also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55 
(describing another example of marginal decision making); Mark F. Grady, Untaken 
Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 151-53 (1989) (describing another process of 
marginal decision-making).
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standards) unicentric issues, such as whether a debt had been 
incurred, a formal promise had been made, or a delineated boundary 
had been crossed.60 The development of more nuanced doctrinal 
solutions to the underlying problems of social coordination came 
later, mainly through the incremental common law process alluded to 
above. Influential jurists and legal scholars helped to conceptualize 
and rationalize emerging doctrinal trends at critical junctures.61 But 
at virtually no point in the development of the common law did 
single judicial decisions come close to creating complex legal 
doctrine out of whole cloth. Historically notable doctrinal leaps are 
almost always seen, upon closer inspection, to have been premised 
on pre-existing lines of incremental doctrinal development.62
2. The American Legal System Generally Avoids Presenting 
Courts with Many-Centered Design Problems
American courts enlist two primary methodologies to avoid 
being required to judge the reasonableness of many-centered design 
problems that arise in “real life,” outside the judicial boundaries. The 
first consists of refusals to review the reasonableness of formally 
identified categories of social and regulatory activity that have a high 
potential of presenting courts with polycentric problems; the second 
methodology, relating to problems that reach courts for decision,
consists of adopting substantive rules that are sufficiently specific 
that they present mostly unicentric issues to be decided at trial. The 
first, resting on categorical refusals to review, permeates both the 
private and the public-law systems. Within tort law, for example, 
courts apply a number of no-duty rules that reject attempts to review, 
inter alia, the reasonableness of intrafamily relationships and 
interactions,63 discretionary governmental decisions regarding the 
management of risk,64 claims based on a general duty to rescue,65 and 
generic risks presented by categories of commercially distributed 
60. For a description of this process in the context of tort law, see
Henderson, The Constitutive Dimensions of Tort, supra note 15, at 233. 
61. Id. at 233 & nn.58 & 60.
62. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053-54 
(N.Y. 1916).
63. See DOBBS, supra note 45, §§ 279-81, at 751-60. 
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006).
65. See DOBBS, supra note 45, §§ 314-15, at 853-56. For an explanation of 
why a general duty to rescue would present courts with polycentric problems, see
James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 
938-40 (1982).
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products.66 In similar fashion within contract law, courts 
categorically refuse to review the reasonableness of fairly-arrived-at 
bargains.67 And this same pattern is observable in virtually every 
other area of American private-law. For example, within the law 
governing business organizations, courts refuse to review the 
reasonableness of management decisions under the business 
judgment rule.68 In each of these private-law contexts, categorical 
refusals to review shield courts from many-centered problems by 
delegating the relevant problem-solving responsibilities to 
nonjudicial, and often nongovernmental, actors.69
Categorical refusals to review also permeate public-law. 
Examples include the justiciability doctrines to be explored in Part II. 
Another example is the refusal to apply constitutional standards and 
requirements to private conduct.70 As reflected in an earlier 
discussion, the lion’s share of problem solving is accomplished by 
individuals and small groups acting privately in a nongovernmental 
capacity.71 Although this private problem solving is subject to limited 
review under common law principles of tort and contract,72 it is not 
subject to the same constitutional review as are governmental 
problem-solving efforts. Were this broad categorical exclusion not in 
place, virtually all private conduct that intrudes to any significant 
measure on the speech, privacy, or equality interests of others would 
present courts with highly polycentric issues. Courts applying 
traditional fault-based tort law already have their hands full in these 
areas, even limited as the issues are in the tort context by the 
66. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998).
For an explanation of why categorical products liability would exceed the limits of 
adjudication, see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the 
American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263 (1991).
67. See Henderson, Contract’s Constitutive Core, supra note 15, at 128-29. 
68. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971). 
See generally S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 93 (1979).
69. For a general treatment of this pattern of delegation in America tort law, 
see generally Henderson, The Constitutive Dimensions of Tort, supra note 15.
70. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 6.4.1, at 519 (“The Constitution’s 
protections of individual liberties and its requirement for equal protection apply only 
to the government. Private conduct generally does not have to comply with the 
Constitution.”). Two major exceptions apply, but they do not present polycentric 
problems. Id. § 6.4.4, at 529.
71. Cf. supra text accompanying note 28. See generally HART & SACKS,
supra note 6, at 158-63. 
72. See sources cited supra note 15.
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requirement that plaintiffs asserting negligence claims show they 
have suffered tangible harm.73 Reviewing private problem solving 
efforts that cause no tangible harm on the same basis as 
governmental regulations are reviewed would threaten to drown both 
courts and party-litigants in a flood tide of polycentricity.74
Another public-law example of courts categorically refusing to 
review the reasonableness of many-centered problems relates to the 
concept of sovereign immunity.75 Nonjudicial governmental 
agencies—primarily the executive and legislative branches—are 
significant problem solvers notwithstanding limitations on their 
lawmaking capabilities.76 Many of the solutions to social 
coordination problems that these agencies promulgate are highly 
polycentric. Were courts generally to entertain tort claims against the 
government on behalf of persons adversely affected by these 
solutions, forcing courts to review them based on vague standards of 
reasonableness, litigants’ rights to participate would be significantly 
compromised. Courts might rely on the same doctrinal devices as 
employed in tort to avoid polycentricity and thus protect litigants’ 
participatory rights.77 But sovereign immunity, supported by a time-
honored historical pedigree and fairly persuasive substantive 
rationales,78 provides a more straightforward, categorical method of 
accomplishing the same objective. American courts recognize two 
versions of the basic principle that the sovereign can do no wrong. 
The first, which bars claims against the states in federal courts, is 
anchored in the Eleventh Amendment.79 The second, which traces its 
roots to English common law, bars actions against the states in state 
73. See, e.g., Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 53 (1st 
Cir. 1985) (holding that there is no recovery in negligence for economic loss unless 
caused by tangible harm to persons or property).
74. A leading treatise writer overlooks this consideration entirely when he 
explains the persistence of the state action doctrine in terms of constitutional text, 
history, and public policy. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 6.4.2, at 524-25. 
Interestingly, the author offers two patently circular reasons why the Supreme Court 
has shielded private, autonomous conduct from federal constitutional review and left 
it to the sovereignty of the states to regulate in those areas: preserving private 
autonomy and promoting state sovereignty. Id. At least the rationale of avoiding 
polycentricity is not so patently circular.
75. See id. § 2.10, at 184-86. 
76. For a discussion of the problem-solving capabilities of, and limits on, 
the nonjudicial branches, see supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
77. Cf. supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text; infra notes 84-86 and 
accompanying text. 
78. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 2.10, at 184-86.
79. Id. § 2.10, at 184.
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courts and actions against the federal government in both state and 
federal courts.80 Both versions of sovereign immunity are subject to 
exceptions and qualifications, none of which introduces many-
centered issues.81
The foregoing examples reflect a judicial methodology of 
categorical refusals to review. The other basic methodology by 
which courts avoid many-centered design problems is rule-
specificity—solving sufficient portions of those problems ahead of 
time, leaving only specifically identified constituent elements to be 
the subject of proofs and arguments at trial.82 Rule-specificity allows 
potentially difficult problem categories to reach court, but adjusts the 
applicable doctrine so that it supports meaningful participation by 
party-litigants. Examples of private-law doctrine “depolycentrizing” 
problems in this manner abound in contract and tort.83 Regarding tort 
law, lawmakers adopt specific standards either ex-ante of the injury-
causing events, as when courts reviewing harm-causing professional 
conduct apply specific patterns of customary professional behavior 
rather than a general reasonableness standard,84 or ex-post of injury, 
as when courts require plaintiffs in negligence cases to identify and 
prove the feasibility of one or more specific precautions that the 
defendant should have taken but did not take.85 Regarding the latter 
alternative, when the court decides ex-post whether or not to adopt 
and apply the plaintiff’s proposed untaken precaution, to some extent 
the court must solve the underlying problem on its own; but the 
question for the court is not whether the alternative course of conduct 
is reasonable “of a whole, all things considered” but whether it 
80. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999) (“[S]overeign immunity 
derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the original 
Constitution itself.”). See generally DOBBS, supra note 45, §§ 268-72, at 716-32.
81. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 2.10, at 185 (“The Supreme Court 
has . . . allowed suits against state officers, permitted states to waive their Eleventh 
Amendment immunity[,] . . . and sanctioned litigation against the states pursuant to 
statutes adopted under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). The Federal Tort Claims Act, 
by which the federal government consents to be sued, excludes claims based on the 
exercise of discretionary judgment, thereby excluding tort claims based on the 
many-centered designs of governmental programs. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2012).
82. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
83. See generally Henderson, Contract’s Constitutive Core, supra note 15;
Henderson, The Constitutive Dimensions of Tort, supra note 15.
84. See DOBBS, supra note 45, § 242, at 632-34.
85. See Grady, supra note 59, at 139.
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represents a marginal improvement compared with the defendant’s 
actual conduct.86
Courts employ the same rule-specificity methodology in 
public-law litigation. One important example resides in the levels-of-
scrutiny approach in equal protection analysis to be examined in Part 
III. Among other examples, judicial review of federal administrative 
agency rulings and regulations is most prominent. Rather than 
deferring categorically to the agency’s judgment, thereby threatening 
the legitimacy and possibly the legality of such agency actions,87
federal courts assume the legitimacy of agency problem solving and 
then undertake a limited review based on formal, essentially 
unicentric rules and standards that support meaningful participation 
by the party-litigants.88 Although a leading authority once observed 
that courts exercise nearly unbounded discretion in applying the 
standards of administrative review,89 thereby implying that the issues 
at trial are unmanageably polycentric,90 a careful, respected scholar 
currently embraces “a more pragmatic, perhaps less despairing 
[view] that detects certain regularities in judicial practice” that 
86. For a decision by the Supreme Court recognizing the relevance of the 
untaken precaution approach in equal protection analysis—and rejecting the 
plaintiffs’ proposed alternative plan for public school funding—see Justice Powell’s 
opinion for the Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 55-56 (1973). 
87. See LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 
(1965) (“The availability of judicial review is the necessary condition . . . of a 
system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid.”). 
For the view that current patterns of judicial review are too lax, see PHILIP 
HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 316 (2014) (claiming that 
judges’ deference to administrators’ interpretations of statutes “is an abandonment 
of judicial office”).
88. See generally STRAUSS, supra note 32, at 297-336. The author 
summarizes: “[T]he general framework . . . assumes the general legitimacy of 
agency action and [undertakes] a judicial role of supervision or oversight rather than 
[substitution of] responsibility.” Id. at 336. Section 706 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act lists six grounds for reversal, the first of which refers to “action, 
findings, and conclusions found to be—arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law” and the next five of which incorporate 
specific sources of law outside the Act itself. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (emphasis 
added). These grounds for reversal have proven to be specific enough to allow 
litigants to participate meaningfully in the review process. It will be observed that 
the emphasized language in § 706 constitutes extreme modifiers that, in the same 
manner as specificity, provides both sides with rhetorical anchors to which they may 
attach their demands for favorable outcomes as matters of right. Id.
89. See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.6, at 
33 (2d ed. 1979).
90. Cf. supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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support this Article’s analysis.91 Other examples of how public-law 
doctrines protecting important civil rights are couched so as to avoid 
presenting courts with highly polycentric problems include the rules 
and standards governing First Amendment privileges relating to free 
expression92 and the free exercise of religious beliefs,93 doctrines 
protecting economic liberties under substantive due process,94 and 
case law vindicating the so-called “fundamental rights” of 
individuals.95 While in all of these areas the overarching substantive 
goal is to protect individuals against unreasonable, intrusive, and 
coercive governmental regulation, from the perspective of this 
analysis, courts have developed regimes of rule formality presenting 
essentially unicentric issues for decision at trial.
II. THE JUSTICIABILITY REQUIREMENTS EXCLUDE HIGHLY 
POLYCENTRIC PROBLEM CATEGORIES FROM THE 
JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCESS
Enhancing party-litigant participation by avoiding many-
centered design problems is certainly not the only explanation for 
why the justiciability doctrines retain their vitality. As observed at 
the outset, maintaining a proper political balance among the branches 
91. See STRAUSS, supra note 32, at 336.
92. For a thorough description of the complex but essentially unicentric 
system of rules involved, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, §§ 11.1-11.6, at 950-
1224. The major components are summarized at id. § 11.1.2, at 953-54. It will be 
recalled, however, that complexity is polycentric only when the elements are 
interdependent as they are not in this context. See supra notes 20-23 and 
accompanying text.
93. For a description of the rule system involved in protecting the 
establishment and free exercise of religion, see generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
1, §§ 12.1-12.3, at 1225-1312. Once again, courts encounter difficulties in defining 
the basis terms, including what are, and are not, “religions.” See id. § 12.1.2, at 
1231-36. But these difficulties are essentially unicentric in nature.
94. See generally id. §§ 8.1-8.4, at 621-82. The interesting aspect here is 
that, during the so-called “Lochner Era,” courts attempted to address polycentric 
design and planning problems under a general reasonableness standard. See Lochner 
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905). This era ended, not surprisingly from this 
Article’s perspective, thirty-plus years later. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 8.2, 
at 639-41.
95. See generally id. §§ 10.1-10.11, at 812-948. The author provides a 
framework for analyzing fundamental rights that reveals the essentially unicentric 
nature of the issues to be decided. Id. § 10.1.2, at 814-18. Once a court determines 
that a fundamental right has been infringed, the government must show that the 
interest thereby served is compelling. See id. § 10.1.2, at 817; cf. infra Section III.D.
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of the federal government is an important factor, as are others.96 The 
more modest claim here, largely overlooked by constitutional 
scholars,97 is that the problems of institutional design and social 
coordination that the justiciability doctrines keep out of court tend to 
be the sorts of complex, many-centered problems that, were courts to 
review them under a general reasonableness standard, would 
frustrate litigants’ opportunities to participate meaningfully in the 
review process. Moreover, the justiciability doctrines, themselves, do 
not present highly polycentric problems in their applications. Thus, 
they accomplish significant net reductions in the many-centeredness 
of the problems that federal courts are called upon to solve. 
A. The Social-Planning Problems Excluded by the Justiciability 
Requirements Tend to Be Highly Polycentric 
1. The Prohibition Against Advisory Opinions and the 
Requirements of Standing and Ripeness Exclude Polycentric 
Problems from Judicial Review
The claims that the justiciability requirements exclude from 
judicial review typically involve regulatory solutions to many-
centered social coordination problems. The controversies excluded 
by the prohibition against advisory opinions and the requirements of 
standing and ripeness typically involve questions of timing. For 
example, a person who is interested in, but not yet directly affected 
by, a particular statute or regulation may understandably desire an 
authoritative ruling on the meaning and validity of the law to help 
him plan his future conduct. He will certainly be allowed to raise 
issues regarding meaning and validity later, if and when enforcement 
proceedings are brought against him alleging violation of the 
statutory or regulatory mandate. In that context, the prohibition 
against advisory opinions and the requirements of standing and 
ripeness will not prevent the enforcement court from reviewing the 
96. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 2.3, at 49-50.
97. Scholars frequently express awareness of the limits on judicial 
competence, but in doing so they invariably refer to mechanical limits such as 
courts’ “limited ability to conduct independent investigations” and the like. See id. §
2.3, at 50; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text. The closest any writer has 
come to recognizing the sorts of systemic, nonmechanical limits on problem-solving 
capacity focused on in this Article is Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1972). For further discussion of Gunther’s analysis, see 
infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
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merits, including statutory meaning and validity.98 But if the 
interested party attempts to obtain a judicial ruling ahead of that 
time, one or more of the just-mentioned justiciability doctrines will 
almost certainly prevent him from doing so.99 For the avoidance of 
polycentricity to help explain why the justiciability doctrines apply 
when the actor “jumps the gun” ex-ante, but not when he seeks to 
avoid an enforcement penalty ex-post, there would have to be 
reasons to believe that questions of regulatory meaning and validity 
are more likely to be polycentric when raised ex-ante in an advisory-
type proceeding than when raised ex-post in the context of 
enforcement.
Such reasons are available. First of all, when a court refuses to 
make an advisory ruling ex-ante, enforcement proceedings may 
never take place ex-post, in which event refusing the advisory 
opinion allows the courts to avoid the polycentric problems 
altogether. More significantly, even when enforcement does occur 
ex-post, in that context the issues of meaning and validity typically 
arise in a context of specific factual circumstances that afford the 
court with the opportunity either to decide the case on narrow 
grounds that avoid the many-centered design issues100 or to extend a 
previous statutory interpretation incrementally by employing the 
methodology of marginal comparison described earlier.101 For 
example, the court in the enforcement context may be able to narrow 
its focus by determining the meaning or validity of a regulation only 
as applied to the specific facts surrounding the alleged violation. By 
contrast, when these issues are presented ex-ante by a party-litigant 
seeking an advisory opinion, the court is more likely to confront the 
issues in the abstract and to review the design of the statute or 
regulation “of a whole,” without the narrowing focus of a detailed 
98. Of course, other means of reducing polycentricity might come into play, 
including rule formality of the sort considered in Part III. But presumably the 
alleged violator’s equal protection-based claim would be justiciable. 
99. The two criteria that must be satisfied to render a claim justiciable under 
the advisory opinion doctrine are, first, an actual dispute must exist between adverse 
parties and, second, a substantial likelihood must exist that a court ruling in the 
claimant’s favor will actually bring about a change in the relevant circumstances. 
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 2.4, at 52-57. Clearly, these criteria would not be 
satisfied in the “jump the gun” hypothetical posed in the text.
100. The court may be able to resolve the case on the facts by concluding 
that, on any reasonable view of the law and assuming that the regulation is valid, no 
violation occurred, or any violation that may have occurred was excused under the 
particular factual circumstances revealed in the record.
101. See supra notes 59, 84-86 and accompanying text.
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factual record.102 It follows that not only do the justiciability 
doctrines prohibiting advisory opinions exclude complex design 
problems from judicial review when raised ex-ante, but also those 
issues typically do not come to court ex-post, at time of subsequent 
enforcement, in nearly so polycentric an incarnation.
In the circumstances considered thus far, the rulings sought are 
advisory in the sense that the plaintiffs seek judicial responses 
prematurely, ahead of the time when such assessments would 
normally accompany dispositive rulings on developed records in 
adversarial enforcement proceedings.103 Courts have extended the 
concept of advisory opinions to cases in which the parties are clearly 
involved in an adversarial controversy—the issues often arise in the 
context of enforcement proceedings—but in which what purports to 
be a dispositive court order is not finally dispositive for reasons 
unrelated to the possibility of reversal on appeal. For example, when 
a statute purports to overturn the finality of a seemingly “final” court 
order, courts deem the statute unlawful for attempting to convert the 
earlier court order into a nonbinding advisory opinion.104 In this 
context, the term “advisory opinion” connotes “nondispositive” 
rather than “premature.” Although the issues thereby removed from 
the federal courts’ review agenda may be polycentric, they are 
probably not more so by reason of being nondispositive than are 
issues routinely decided by federal courts in other contexts. It 
follows that these applications of the advisory-opinion prohibition 
are explainable mainly in terms of separation-of-powers concerns.105
It remains to consider how the doctrines of standing and 
ripeness help to minimize the many-centeredness of issues presented 
for judicial resolution. Ripeness concerns the issue considered in 
connection with advisory opinions—whether conditions ever warrant 
allowing a party to obtain preenforcement review—but offers fairly 
narrowly defined circumstances in which such review will be 
allowed.106 These circumstances include unusual hardship to the 
parties from withholding early review and fitness of the issues for 
102. The open-endedness of what plaintiffs seek in these cases has prompted 
the Supreme Court to refer to them as “‘generalized grievance[s].’” See Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 2.5.5, 
at 91-99.
103. See, e.g., Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 
249, 264-65 (1933).
104. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 217-19 (1995).
105. See id. at 225.
106. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).
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early judicial decision.107 The latter condition is especially interesting 
from this Article’s perspective. Consistent with this analysis, the 
more likely that waiting for a more developed factual record would 
render the issue to be decided less many-centered, the more likely it 
is that lack of ripeness will act as a bar to preenforcement review. By 
contrast to ripeness, standing relates less to the issue of when judicial 
review is appropriate and more to the issue of who may obtain such 
review.108 The prerequisites for standing are a personally suffered 
injury traceable to the defendant and a strong likelihood that a 
favorable decision will redress the injury.109 A commonly articulated 
rationale is that these requirements help to ensure that the party 
seeking review is adequately motivated to pursue the claim 
vigorously.110 This Article’s analysis frames the point somewhat 
differently. The standing requirements encourage not only a rigorous 
presentation, but also a presentation that reduces the many-
centeredness of the issues by focusing on the narrowest, most fact-
sensitive grounds for a favorable outcome. A party seeking redress 
for actual injury is more likely to focus her presentation in this 
manner than is an uninjured plaintiff seeking to make her point more 
abstractly. Thus, from the process perspective developed in this 
Article, standing helps to improve not only the forcefulness of the 
plaintiff’s presentation, but also its direction and content.
2. The Justiciability Doctrine Prohibiting Responses to 
Political Questions Excludes Highly Polycentric Problems 
from Judicial Review
To appreciate the many-centeredness of the institutional-design 
problems excluded from judicial review by the political question 
doctrine, one need only consider the doctrine at work. For example, 
the Supreme Court has approved lower court refusals to review the 
reasonableness of plans for the training of the Ohio National 
Guard;111 designs of congressional districts;112 plans for the seating of 
107. Id. at 149.
108. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972)
109. Id. at 734-35 (personally suffered injury); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737, 751 (1984) (causation and redressability).
110. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (holding that a 
plaintiff should have “such a personal stake in the outcome . . . as to assure that 
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court 
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions”).
111. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 3-4, 11-12 (1973).
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delegates at a Democratic National Convention;113 foreign policy 
decisions by the federal executive;114 and designs of procedures for 
congressional self-governance.115 Besides these outcomes generally 
being supported by a separation-of-powers rationale,116 the 
underlying social coordination problems share a high level of 
polycentricity for that reason are unadjudiciable under a vague 
reasonableness standard.117
B. Applying the Justiciability Requirements Does Not Present 
Highly Polycentric Problems
1. Applying the Doctrines Governing Advisory Opinions, 
Standing, and Ripeness Does Not Present Highly 
Polycentric Problems
Were courts to apply vague standards in determining whether 
sought-after rulings are “advisory,” “premature,” or “dispositive,” 
litigants would be less able to insist on outcomes as a matter of right. 
However, as indicated in the preceding discussion of advisory 
opinions and standing, courts have articulated formal criteria of 
justiciability that determine whether or not a plaintiff’s case may 
proceed.118 To these foundational criteria the Supreme Court has 
added requirements that further decrease the polycentricity of the 
issues to be decided.119 In determining whether these criteria are 
sufficient to support meaningful party-litigant participation, it will be 
112. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271-73, 306 (2004) (plurality 
opinion).
113. See O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 2-5 (1972) (per curiam).
114. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 299-300, 304 
(1918).
115. See, e.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 669-70, 673 
(1892).
116. See supra note 96 and text accompanying.
117. See supra notes 48-53 and text accompanying. As a subsequent 
discussion will indicate, the Supreme Court has held that the lack of a manageably 
specific standard for determining outcomes is an independent ground for invoking 
the political question doctrine. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 99 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying 
note 109.
119. These include a rule against asserting injury-based claims on behalf of 
third parties; a rule denying claims by taxpayers who share their grievances with 
taxpayers generally; and a rule requiring the plaintiff’s claim to be within the zone 
of interests protected by the regulation in question. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1,
§ 2.5.1, at 62, §§ 2.5.4-2.5.6, at 83-104.
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observed that, while what constitutes an injury for purposes of the
rules governing advisory opinions admits of several 
interpretations,120 Supreme Court decisions have formally identified 
specific categories of injury that have achieved the status of settled 
law. For example, injuries to a range of legal rights have been held to 
suffice to support judicial review,121 as have injuries to economic 
interests122 and environmental interests.123 And any related judicial 
determinations regarding the likelihood that a given plaintiff will 
suffer future injury or be negatively affected by the granting of relief 
present essentially unicentric, more-versus-less, problems.124
Moreover, the circumstance that federal courts applying these 
doctrinal matrixes tend to resolve the issues as a matter of law 
suggests that the issues for decision are relatively unicentric.125
Critics have lamented the lack of unifying principles with which to 
reconcile Supreme Court rulings on what constitutes an injury for 
purposes of standing.126 However, such criticisms involve substance 
more than process—as long as the rule of decision applicable in a 
given case is formulated to avoid excessive many-centeredness, the 
rule will support meaningful participation by the litigants.127
120. One scholar has observed: “No ascertainable principle exists to 
rationalize [Supreme Court] rulings” on what constitutes an injury for standing 
purposes. See id. § 2.5.2, at 72.
121. See id. § 2.5.2, at 69-72.
122. See, e.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 
U.S. 727, 734 (1972)).
124. Presumably such a likelihood would be determined on a linear scale of 
probability. For a description of unicentric problem solving, see supra Section I.A.
125. For matter-of-law ruling as a matter of law to be justified when the 
relevant facts are not in dispute, the legal rules and standards must be specific 
enough to allow the courts to avoid relying on triers of fact to respond to mixed 
questions of law and fact. Cf. Fuller, supra note 1, at 369, 398.
126. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 2.5.3, at 79.
127. That is, from an overarching Olympian perspective, all of the rules, 
standards, exceptions, and precedents may not add up to a conceptually cohesive 
whole, and from a substantive standpoint that is regrettable. But if the law applicable 
in a given case is sufficiently specific and has a plausible rationale, the litigant 
working under that law will have a meaningful day in court.
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2. Applying the Doctrine Excluding Political Questions from 
Judicial Review Does Not Present Highly Polycentric 
Problems
An earlier discussion indicates why a system of judicial review 
that promises party-litigants meaningful opportunities to participate 
would be well served by keeping the sorts of social coordination and 
institutional design problems deemed political questions out of 
court.128 Here the question is whether the rules determining what are, 
and are not, political questions render that issue manageably 
unicentric. In the view of one influential commentator, they do not: 
“[The] criteria [adopted by the Supreme Court] seem useless in 
identifying what constitutes a political question. . . . As such, it 
hardly is surprising that the doctrine is described as confusing and 
unsatisfactory.”129 By contrast to the earlier-considered criticisms 
aimed at the overall lack of consistency in the principles underlying 
the advisory opinion/standing doctrines,130 the foregoing criticism 
comes close to rejecting the political question doctrine for being too 
vaguely open-textured—for amounting to little more than an 
assurance that federal judges will “know a political question when 
they see one.”131 If such were the case, applying the doctrine would 
be every bit as problematic as trying to solve the political questions 
sought to be excluded, thereby denying party-litigants the 
opportunity to guide courts to favorable outcomes. 
But the just-quoted criticism misses the mark. Admittedly, 
judged only by separation-of-powers criteria, the Supreme Court has 
reached results that sometimes appear inexplicable. For example, 
decisions condoning judicial reapportionment of state legislatures 
and upholding judicial redesign of public schools involve “political” 
questions as that phrase is used in common parlance, and yet the 
political question doctrine poses no barrier to robust judicial 
review.132 When one examines the pattern of outcomes in these and 
128. Cf. supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
129. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 2.8.1, at 132-33.
130. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
131. Cf. Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 
184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring), regarding pornography: “I know it when I 
see it.”
132. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (“Of course the mere 
fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a 
political question.”); Swann v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 
(1971) (allowing judicial review in a case of public school redesign).
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related cases from the process perspective advanced in this Article, 
however, an acceptable level of consistency emerges. In both the 
reapportionment and the school redesign cases, fairly specific legal 
standards are available with which to decide the substantive issues 
without courts being forced to rely on vague reasonableness 
standards.133 By contrast, in the cases in which the Supreme Court 
has invoked the political question doctrine to bar judicial review, no 
manageably specific standards are available with which to reduce the 
polycentricity of the issues to be decided.134 Perhaps the clearest 
example of how the availability of a manageable legal standard 
determines whether judicial review will occur involves federal 
redistricting and gerrymandering. Although an earlier Supreme Court 
decision had held that challenges to gerrymandering were justiciable 
because standards more manageable than reasonableness would be 
forthcoming,135 a more recent decision by the Court reversed the 
earlier holding and invoked the political question doctrine because 
adequate standards had not emerged for two decades, nor would they 
emerge in the future.136
So the applicability of the political question doctrine does not 
turn simply on whether the issue before the court is highly political 
or whether a ruling one way or the other would arguably intrude on 
the prerogatives of a nonjudicial branch of government. Instead, 
consistent with this Article’s analysis, applicability of the political 
question doctrine turns mainly on the availability of a substantive 
133. Baker v. Carr established the one-person-one-vote standard that renders 
unicentric the central issues in reapportionment cases. 369 U.S. at 208; see also 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 2.8.3, at 138-39 (illustrating a combination of rule 
adjustments and delegative procedural innovations that renders unicentric the issues 
for judicial decision in the context of school redesign); infra notes 201-02 and 
accompanying text. 
134. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
135. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123 (1986).
136. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (plurality opinion), in 
which a plurality of four Justices concluded that no adequately manageable standard 
is available. Justice Kennedy concurred in the result but held out hope that 
manageable standards would emerge. Id. at 312 (Kennedy, J., concurring). One 
critic has argued that, given the unlikelihood that a workable standard more specific 
than reasonableness would ever be available, it would have been preferable for the 
Court to employ a rational basis standard of review in connection with 
gerrymandering claims. See Joshua S. Stillman, Note, The Costs of “Discernible and 
Manageable Standards” in Vieth and Beyond, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1292, 1321, 1323 
(2009). However, from the process perspective developed herein, lack of a viable 
standard would end up frustrating rational basis judicial review in any event. See
infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
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rule of decision sufficiently specific to reduce the open-endedness of 
the analysis sufficiently to allow party-litigants to participate 
meaningfully and courts to reach purposeful, consistent decisions.137
And the issues regarding the relative availability of a workable legal 
standard and the relative need for judicial discretion are themselves 
sufficiently unicentric to render them adjudicable.138 Thus, the rule 
barring judicial review of political questions eliminates more 
polycentricity than its application generates, rendering more 
meaningful the role of party-litigants in helping to steer federal 
courts away from the thickets of political wrangling engaged in by 
the other branches employing nonadjudicative decision processes. 
C. The Justiciability Requirements Constitute Principled Grounds for 
Limiting Judicial Review: The Bickel–Gunther Debate
More than fifty years ago, Alexander Bickel published a 
provocative law review article on judicial review139 that subsequently 
became the centerpiece of an influential book.140 In both, the author 
describes and defends what he terms the “passive virtues”—a
collection of doctrinal devices, including the justiciability doctrines, 
whereby federal courts may at their discretion withhold 
constitutional adjudication of issues otherwise properly before 
137. In Baker v. Carr, the Court identified six “independent” tests for 
determining whether or not a political question is presented. 369 U.S. at 217. Four of 
the tests (the first, fourth, fifth, and sixth in Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court) 
relate to separation-of-powers concerns and, taken together, constitute a necessary 
condition for the doctrine’s application. Id. The other two (the second and third) are 
the ones required by this Article’s analysis: “[The] lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving [the substantive question before the court]” 
and “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion.” Id. Both the underlying logic and a fair and 
sensible reading of the case law indicate that the tests reflecting separation-of-power 
concerns are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for application of the political 
question doctrine. As the Supreme Court’s decisions in a number of cases make 
clear, only the second and third tests, relating to the absence of a manageable 
standard that supports nondiscretionary decision making, constitute both necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the application of the political question doctrine.
138. See supra text following note 15. Both the second and the third tests 
from Baker v. Carr present the more-versus-less judgmental tasks that are 
characteristic of unicentric, adjudicable issues. 369 U.S. at 217. 
139. See generally Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
140. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986).
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them.141 He observes that principles of federal constitutional law 
often develop slowly and that occasions arise in which a federal 
court, reviewing decisions of the other branches, cannot decide one 
way or the other in principled fashion. At these junctures it is 
expedient for federal courts neither to strike down nor to legitimize 
challenged regulations but instead to refuse to decide the 
constitutional issues, deferring to the political branches either to 
reach stable solutions or to work on the problems so that the 
Supreme Court is better able to develop the constitutional principles 
necessary for eventual judicial solution.142 Bickel endorses these 
deferral devices as legitimate means of preserving the principled 
integrity of the judicial review process. Because he views the devices 
as equivalent to “no decisions” on the relevant constitutional issues, 
he is willing to grant federal courts broad discretion regarding when 
the devices should, or should not, be invoked.143 He reasons that the 
same system that embraces a discretionary, certiorari-based approach 
to setting the Court’s appellate agenda should not balk at doing the 
same thing via his “passive virtues.”144
Shortly after Bickel’s book appeared, Gerald Gunther 
published a highly critical review of what he calls the “subtle vices” 
of Bickel’s passive-virtues analysis.145 Because Bickel includes the 
justiciability doctrines among his passive virtues, and because 
Gunther’s critique of Bickel’s thesis is devastating (at least in the 
view of this author), it is important to make clear that the instant 
analysis of justiciability does not fall prey to Gunther’s critique of 
141. See id. at 207; Bickel, supra note 139, at 42.
142. See BICKEL, supra note 140, at 69-71.
143. Id. at 127-28.
144. Id. at 126. Clearly, Bickel is wrong in this regard. Articulable criteria 
are available that presumably guide the Court to some degree in deciding whether or 
not to grant such writs. See SUP. CT. R. 19(1). Moreover, the Court’s refusal to hear 
an appeal does not mean that the parties are denied the opportunity to be heard in 
court. Presumably, the claim will have been adjudicated at trial in federal or state 
court and, if warranted, reviewed to final judgment on appeal, fulfilling the promise 
to the parties that they will be given the opportunity to participate meaningfully in 
the process of judicial review, albeit not necessarily in federal court. From the 
descriptive perspective of this analysis, given the tradition of discretionary Supreme 
Court review, the system makes no promise that the highest federal court will hear 
every appeal. This conclusion begs the question from a normative perspective; but 
clearly Bickel is wrong descriptively in equating the certiorari phenomenon with his 
discretionary system of “passive virtues.”
145. See generally Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive 
Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1964).
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Bickel’s “deferral of decision” approach. In essence, Gunther 
accuses Bickel of placing expediency ahead of principle.146
According to Gunther, the “no decision” option is an illusion. In 
reality, it represents a denial of the plaintiff’s claim of illegal 
governmental action and thus a legitimation of the status quo.147
Gunther argues that to vest federal courts with broad discretion to 
refuse to decide whenever a decision on the merits appears badly 
timed or conceptually inconvenient is essentially lawless.148
Although Bickel’s analysis and this Article share a common 
concern for keeping difficult problems out of court, the means by 
which they seek to achieve that common objective are mirror 
opposites. Reflecting the view that deferring judgment is not judging 
at all, Bickel gives federal courts broad discretion to decide, on a 
case-by-case basis, whether or not to defer. In granting such 
discretion, obviously Bickel allows courts to solve highly polycentric 
problems. By contrast, working from the premise that affording 
party-litigants meaningful opportunities to participate is a 
responsibility properly assigned to courts, this Article observes that 
justiciability rejects primarily those categories of claims whose 
many-centeredness would diminish such opportunities and does so 
by means of an evolving set of relatively formal rules. Because 
unfettered judicial discretion all but destroys party-litigants’ chances 
of meaningful participation, the concept of justiciability described in 
this Article aims at reducing such discretion rather than, in Bickel’s 
vision, embracing, enlarging, and promoting it. Simply stated, the 
approach to issue avoidance described in this Article is principled in 
a manner that Bickel’s is not.
In a subsequent law review article, Gunther considers the 
question of whether the inherent limits of judicial competence justify 
the development of doctrine that self-consciously assigns difficult 
planning and design problems to nonjudicial decision makers, 
including the other governmental branches and the marketplace.149
Observe that this clearly is not Bickel’s vision—Bickel is condoning 
the ad hoc exercise of judicial discretion based on informed judicial 
intuition. By contrast, Gunther is considering essentially what this 
Article describes—judicial recognition of institutional limits that 
may properly be dealt with by the development of categorical, rule-
146. See id. at 5 (“[T]he inferences Bickel draws . . . yield guidelines which 
invite not accommodation but surrender of principle to expediency.”).
147. See id. at 7.
148. See id. at 13.
149. See Gunther, supra note 97, at 23-24.
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based exclusion mechanisms. In a remarkably prescient passage, 
Gunther considers the possibility of elaborating on traditionally 
recognized mechanical aspects of limited judicial competence150 to 
include the sorts of limits described in this analysis. He refers to 
Justice Stewart’s majority opinion in a decision in which the Court 
employs a minimum level of scrutiny in upholding a state law 
placing an aggregate cap on family welfare benefits regardless of 
family size.151 Gunther observes: “Justice Stewart’s [concern over 
adjudicability] is a justifiable concern when problems are truly 
‘intractable’: [that is,] when the Court cannot confidently assess 
whether the means contribute to the end because the data are 
exceedingly technical and complex.”152
III. HOW THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF SCRUTINY IN EQUAL 
PROTECTION BASED JUDICIAL REVIEW HELP MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR 
PARTY-LITIGANTS TO PARTICIPATE MEANINGFULLY
A. Why the Concept of Equality, by Itself, Does Not Avoid 
Polycentric Issues for Decision: Peter Westen’s Insight
The philosophical basis of equal protection jurisprudence—that 
persons who are alike should be treated alike—might appear to 
provide built-in, specific standards by which to judge the 
reasonableness of regulatory classifications. To be sure, substantive 
due process appears to require application of an external 
reasonableness standard, threatening to generate polycentric issues 
for judicial decision.153 But to decide an equal protection claim, it 
would appear that one need only compare the treatment afforded the 
claimant with the treatment afforded similar persons—a unicentric 
quantification problem. Or so it seemed to many observers until 
Professor Westen explained that in order to determine whether two 
or more individuals are sufficiently alike to require equal treatment, 
one must determine how each of them is entitled to be treated under 
the relevant external, noncomparison-based set of values, and that 
once that determination is made, the need to compare the 
150. Id. at 23. 
151. See id. at 23-24, wherein the author quotes Justice Stewart. For the 
quoted language, see infra text accompanying note 171.
152. See Gunther, supra note 97, at 24.
153. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 7.1, at 557-58 (“[S]ubstantive due 
process looks [for] a sufficient justification for the government’s action.”).
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individuals’ alikeness to one another, as such, disappears.154 In a 
word, Westen concludes that the concept of equality, and by 
implication its derivative, equal protection, are “empty”—they beg, 
rather than answer, the underlying normative question.
Westen’s article has prompted responses and commentaries 
exploring many aspects of the subject—except for the aspect upon 
which this Article focuses.155 In essence, the critics argue that while 
Westen’s core insight is valid, the author overstates his position by 
arguing that the concept of equality is altogether empty. Thus, 
Professor (now Dean) Chemerinsky argues that even if Westen is 
correct logically, the concept of equality is nevertheless useful in 
legal discourse.156 He argues that “a concept [like equality] is 
analytically useful if it [does no more than] determine[] who has the 
benefit of a presumption in a dispute and who must bear the burden 
of proof.”157 He observes that because the primary concern of 
equality analysis is not to avoid unjustified equal treatment but to 
avoid unfair discrimination, an experience-based presumption that 
superficially similar persons deserve equal treatment is warranted 
even though the basis for such a presumption cannot be derived 
logically from the concept of equality.158 Thus, any regulation that 
discriminates between two seemingly similar classes of actors may 
rationally be presumed, subject to rebuttal, to be a violation of the 
equality principle. From Chemerinsky’s perspective, such 
presumptions are analytically useful even if they are not logically 
necessary; from this Article’s perspective, they are useful in reducing 
polycentricity when courts create presumptions of validity or 
invalidity and then require rebuttal based on unicentric elements of 
proof.159
154. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 
553 (1982).
155. See generally, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of 
Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1983); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of 
Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575 (1983); Christopher J. 
Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis,
105 YALE L.J. 2031 (1996); Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1210 (1997); Kent Greenawalt, “Prescriptive Equality”: Two Steps Forward,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1997).
156. Chemerinsky, supra note 155, at 588-91.
157. Id. at 587-88.
158. Id. at 588.
159. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (describing judicial 
review of actions by administrative agencies); infra notes 163-66 and accompanying 
text (describing judicial review of governmental classifications under the rational 
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B. A Summary of the Different Levels of Scrutiny
Equal protection based judicial review consists of answering 
three basic questions: first, into which classification category does 
the challenged governmental regulation fall?; second, depending in 
large measure on the category, what is the appropriate level of 
judicial scrutiny?; and third, does the challenged regulation pass 
muster under the applicable level of scrutiny?160 Two categories of 
regulatory classification—race and gender—are sufficiently suspect 
to require heightened scrutiny. Classifications based on race are 
presumed to be unconstitutional unless the government proves that 
they are necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose and 
that the purpose cannot be achieved by less discriminatory means.161
Regulatory classifications based on gender are presumed to be 
unconstitutional unless the government proves that they are 
substantially related to an important government purpose.162 All other 
forms of classification are presumed to be constitutional unless the 
claimant proves that a particular example has no rational basis 
whatsoever—that it could not possibly serve any legitimate 
government purpose.163 The following sections examine these 
different levels of scrutiny more closely, beginning with the rational 
basis test applicable to most government regulations. The analysis 
will focus on judicial manageability and the preservation of party-
litigants’ opportunities to participate rather than on substantive or 
political rationales.
C. The Manageability of Rational Basis Review 
It may seem odd that, aside from considerations of race and 
gender, governmental classifications that serve no important public 
purpose and are downright unfair should pass constitutional muster 
as long as they can be related to some government interest, even if 
basis test); infra notes 191-192 and accompanying text (describing judicial review 
under strict scrutiny); cf. supra text following note 13.
160. See CHEMERINKSY, supra note 1, § 9.1.2, at 685-90.
161. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) 
(plurality opinion).
162. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
163. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per 
curiam). The Supreme Court has observed that a strong presumption exists in favor 
of regulations reviewed under the rational basis test. See, e.g., McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
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that interest is not the one actually intended to be served.164
Nevertheless, in the absence of suspect classifications, almost total 
deference is the received wisdom from a substantive perspective. 
This was not always the case; in an earlier era, the Supreme Court 
played a more aggressive role in reviewing the reasonableness of 
economic regulations.165 And even today, the Court condones 
aggressive review when regulations place so-called “fundamental 
rights” in jeopardy.166 In any event, from the process perspective 
developed in this Article, rational basis review in connection with 
most regulatory classifications is quite understandable. Even if little 
may be said substantively in support of a number of regulatory 
classifications, invariably such classifications are part of larger 
governmental designs that, whether politically unimportant or unfair, 
are highly polycentric. The rational basis test, which defers to the 
political branches in connection with the great majority of 
governmental regulations, thereby avoids drowning litigants in an 
ocean of many-centeredness. 
Critics of the different-levels-of-scrutiny approach to equal 
protection argue that it is too formal and rigid, and relies too heavily 
on how courts initially characterize cases.167 Many such critics, 
especially critics of rational basis review, prefer that courts address, 
on a case-by-case basis, the many-centered question of whether or 
not the collective governmental interests promoted by a classification 
are, all things considered, sufficiently important to justify 
curtailment of the individual interests at stake.168 It is difficult to 
imagine a means of adjudicating equal protection claims more 
potentially destructive of party-litigants’ rights to participate than 
such an open-ended, discretion-based approach. To be sure, the 
164. See, e.g., McGowan, 366 U.S. at 425-26.
165. See, for example, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905), in 
which the Court declared unconstitutional a New York law that set maximums for 
the hours that commercial bakers could work. The Court applied a vague test of 
reasonableness and appropriateness in light of “the safety, health, morals, and 
general welfare of the public.” Id. at 53; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 
8.2.2, at 630-37; Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1717-18 (1984); cf. supra note 94 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 
(1990) (explaining the right to refuse medical treatment is part of liberty protected 
by the due process clause). 
167. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming 
Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 173-74 (1984); infra
notes 172-73, 179-82 and accompanying text.
168. See Shaman, supra note 167, at 174.
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lawmaking involved in creating the rule structures relating to levels 
of scrutiny require courts to address polycentric problems, even if 
only marginally.169 But once those structures are in place, the 
problems presented for adjudication are essentially unicentric, 
quantification problems that support meaningful party-litigant 
participation.
Specific examples will help focus the analysis. Fairly early in 
the development of modern rational basis review, a claimant argued 
that a Maryland public welfare program was unconstitutional 
because by placing an aggregate dollar limit on family benefits 
regardless of family size, it unfairly discriminated against needy 
children in large families when measured on a benefits-per-capita 
basis.170 A divided Court upheld the program on the ground that it 
had a rational basis even if some might characterize the fixed limit as 
unfair. Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart rested the Court’s 
conclusion partly on process grounds that reflect this Article’s 
concern over the difficulties of courts reviewing many-centered 
planning and design decisions:
We do not decide today that the Maryland regulation is wise, . . . or that a 
more just and humane system could not be devised. Conflicting claims of 
morality and intelligence are raised by opponents and proponents of
almost every measure, certainly including the one before us. But the 
intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems 
presented . . . are not the business of this Court.171
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented based on 
what he deemed the manifest unfairness of the state placing an 
inflexible dollar limit on family benefits. Clearly implying that the 
business of the Court does most certainly include reviewing the 
reasonableness of welfare limits on a case-by-case basis, Justice
Marshall characterizes Justice Stewart’s categorical, process-oriented 
approach as the “emasculation of the Equal Protection Clause.”172
Although Justice Marshall purports to be applying the rational basis 
test, his opinion reveals his contempt for a scope-of-review rule that 
defers significant political responsibility to a decision-making 
entity—the state of Maryland—which he clearly does not trust.173
169. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
170. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 (1970).
171. Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 508 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
173. See id. at 528-30. Marshall clearly favors a more flexible, nuanced 
approach to measure welfare benefits, one over which the federal courts would have 
the final say. See id. at 520-21.
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A landmark Supreme Court decision not long after the 
Maryland welfare-benefits case reflects these same tensions between 
the rule embraced by the majority of the Court, which defers 
judgment on highly polycentric social design and planning issues, 
and the rule preferred by the minority who advocate much more 
aggressive judicial review.174 The case involved a class-action attack 
on the Texas public school financing system’s reliance on ad 
valorem property taxes, thereby providing lower funding for schools 
in poorer districts.175 As in the Maryland benefits case, a majority of 
the Court refused to substitute their judgment regarding school 
funding for that of the Texas state officials whom the majority saw to 
be struggling mightily with a highly complex, many-centered 
planning problem. In his opinion for the majority, Justice Powell 
observed that any solution to the problem is a function of many 
interdependent variables, including fiscal policies, educational 
policies, considerations of dividing control between state and local 
managers, and issues of federalism.176 Given this many-centered 
complexity, solutions should be left to state administrators.177 In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Stewart, while acknowledging that the 
Texas school funding plan was “chaotic and unjust,” insisted that 
more aggressive review “would mark an extraordinary departure 
from principled adjudication.”178
Four Justices dissented, including Justice Marshall who wrote 
separately to reject the majority’s “rigidified approach”179 and to 
condone more expansive scrutiny that would require the Court to 
address what are clearly polycentric problems under a general 
reasonableness standard.180 According to Justice Marshall, instead of 
adopting the alternative designs for public school funding 
specifically suggested by the plaintiffs, the Court can avoid imposing 
its own design simply by invalidating the “mere sham” of the design 
174. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 1 (1973).
175. Id. at 4-7.
176. Id. at 42-44.
177. Id. at 43 (“[T]he judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing on 
the [s]tates inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap 
the continued research and experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions
to educational problems . . . .”).
178. Id. at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 98 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
180. Marshall refers to “a spectrum of standards in reviewing 
discrimination.” Id. at 98. Many pages later he observes, “[I]t seems to me that 
discrimination on the basis of group wealth in this case . . . calls for careful judicial 
scrutiny.” Id. at 122.
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currently in place.181 Under Justice Marshall’s approach, when the 
State of Texas replaces its existing funding design with another, the 
Court may again undertake polycentric-design review, and so on, 
until the Court is satisfied that the design last chosen by the state is 
acceptably fair and reasonable. Whatever may be said for such an 
approach on the substantive merits, clearly it would involve what 
Justice Marshall appears to deny—the imposition by federal courts 
of their own solutions to the problem of public school funding.182
A leading scholarly observer concludes that the rational basis 
test articulated by Justices Stewart and Powell applies in all instances 
not involving suspect categories.183 Consistent with this assessment, 
the Court has set aside nonsuspect classifications in only a very few 
cases.184 Certainly it is reasonable to attribute this pattern of judicial 
deference in significant measure to the political reality that 
legislative and executive regulators typically possess information,
hands-on expertise, and political accountability that courts generally 
lack.185 Rather than disagreeing with this attribution, this Article 
suggests an additional rationale, equally consistent with the data: in 
part, the rational basis test persists because a majority of Justices 
understand that, if they were to undertake generally to review the 
reasonableness of governmental regulation, they would be doing so 
by exercising largely unsupervised discretion, with no opportunity by 
the party-litigants to participate meaningfully in the process. 
Justice Marshall refuses to defer to the political branches 
because for him political concerns outweigh those of process—he 
does not trust school officials to take into account fairly and honestly 
the interests of politically powerless minorities, such as the 
chronically poor. Up to a point, of course, so long as courts retain 
181. Id. at 129-30. “[T]his Court . . . should require that the State present 
something more [in the way of an alternative school financing scheme] than the 
mere sham now before us.” Id. at 130.
182. Over time, if such a scenario ever played out, the Court would have 
redesigned the Texas school funding scheme just as surely as if it had issued 
injunctive relief in the first instance. Cf. infra note 197 and accompanying text.
183. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 9.2.1, at 694 (“Although the Court 
ha[d] phrased the test in different ways, the basic requirement is that a law meets 
rational basis review if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.”).
184. See, e.g., id. § 9.2.3, at 706 (“Cases [where the Court has set aside 
regulation under rational basis review] indicate that [the test] is not completely 
toothless. Yet it also must be remembered that these are the rare and exceptional 
cases . . . .”).
185. This is the major thrust of what Justices Stewart and Powell were saying
in Dandridge and Rodriguez. See supra notes 171, 176 and accompanying text. 
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sufficient formal structure to assure meaningful party-litigant 
participation, distrust of the political branches may be viewed by 
some as the essence of the Supreme Court’s role in protecting 
individuals’ civil rights.186 However, by all but abandoning formal 
structure, Justice Marshall’s analysis threatens to go too far. In 
effect, from Justices Powell and Stewart’s perspective, Justice 
Marshall insists that the citizenry trust him to do the right thing even 
as he denies those most directly affected—the party-litigants—any 
meaningful opportunity to participate, save as supplicants seeking 
empathy in Justice Marshall’s discretionary decision making.187
Understandably, the plaintiffs in the welfare-limits and school-
funding cases would have preferred being beggars before Justice 
Marshall to being denied relief at the hands of Justices Powell and 
Stewart. But defendants as well as plaintiffs deserve their day in 
court. Moreover, in other circumstances it will be plaintiffs who 
benefit from the levels-of-scrutiny approach. And there exists the 
possibility that Justice Marshall’s approach, based so heavily on 
judicial discretion, will be seen by fair-minded observers as 
something of a sham—judges purporting to listen intently to 
arguments that they do not feel bound to take seriously in reaching 
their decision.188
D. The Manageability of Strict Scrutiny Review
One of the most interesting aspects of strict scrutiny review is 
how, by condemning almost all suspect classifications that 
disadvantage minorities based on race, national origin, or alienage, 
courts avoid many-centered coordination problems to no less degree 
than they avoid them under the rational basis test by which courts 
uphold almost all nonsuspect classifications. Although these two 
distinct levels of scrutiny point in opposite directions, both allow 
courts to avoid polycentric problems. The analogy to “no duty” and 
“strict liability” rules in tort law is useful. In those familiar contexts, 
the tort liability rules at the opposite extremes do not present 
186. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 84-85 (1980).
187. Although he probably did not realize what he was doing in this regard, 
Justice Marshall’s approach would deny the litigants any meaningful opportunity to 
participate except as either cheerleaders or supplicants begging for mercy. 
188. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
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significant process difficulties.189 Only when courts attempt to 
occupy the middle ground—to review complex, many-centered 
patterns of conduct based on negligence standards of reasonable 
care—do courts routinely confront polycentric problems.190 The next 
Section examines the extent to which the intermediate scrutiny 
approach, undertaken in connection with gender-based classification, 
forces courts to occupy such a potentially troublesome middle 
ground. Here, the focus is on classifications based on race, national 
origin, or alienage. In this context, as suggested earlier, a regulation 
will be declared illegal—the government will, in effect, be held 
“strictly liable”—unless the government can carry the heavy burden 
of proving that the regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling 
government purpose.191 In practice, this is tantamount to a per se rule 
of illegality, presenting few polycentric problems for the court to 
solve.192
The threshold question of whether a given classification is 
based on one or more of the suspect categories may present 
polycentric problems. When the regulation discriminates expressly, 
the issue of whether race, national origin, or alienage are involved is 
not particularly polycentric.193 But when a facially neutral 
classification has a racially discriminatory impact, one can anticipate 
difficulties. To avoid many-centered problems in that context, courts 
require claimants to prove that the regulators acted with 
discriminatory purpose.194 Although this requirement may act as a 
substantive impediment to the claimant’s receiving the relief he 
seeks and is controversial for that reason,195 it eliminates highly 
189. See supra notes 63-66 (explaining that no-duty tort rules prevent 
polycentric negligence claims from being adjudicated); see also Henderson, 
Constitutive Dimensions of Tort, supra note 15, at 244-45 (explaining that rules of 
strict liability in tort do not present polycentric problems).
190. See Henderson, Constitutive Dimensions of Tort, supra note 15, at 237; 
cf. supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
192. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
193. Indeed, the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden is greatly eased. See text 
accompanying note 189.
194. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
195. See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, “Mere” Rationality in Constitutional 
Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1071-77, 
1088 (1979) (favoring the purpose requirement); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent 
in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1989) (opposing the purpose 
requirement).
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polycentric problems.196 It follows that the threshold issues presented 
by equal protection review under a strict scrutiny standard are not so 
polycentric as to jeopardize litigants’ opportunities to participate 
meaningfully in the review process.
It remains to consider two subject areas—injunctions aimed at 
remedying the historical effects of invidious racial discrimination
and race-based affirmative action programs—that may be more 
problematic from a process perspective. Fashioning injunctive 
remedies in connection with public school desegregation has proven 
difficult.197 Once again, the focus here is not on the substantive 
merits, but on the manageability of the problems that courts are 
being asked to solve. The constituent elements of educational 
planning are mutually interdependent, including modes of financing, 
physical facilities, separation of grade levels, transportation, staffing, 
curricula, and the like. When a trial court undertakes to issue a 
desegregation order guided only by vague standards of fairness and 
reasonableness, the court must redesign the existing educational 
entities, thereby solving a many-centered social coordination 
problem.198 Although the Supreme Court has made clear that federal 
courts are empowered to issue such orders,199 the problem solving 
involved in framing them threatens to deny party-litigants any 
meaningful opportunity to guide courts through linear chains of logic 
to outcomes claimed of right.200 Developments in recent years 
suggest that the Supreme Court is aware of these difficulties and is 
willing both to adjust substantive rules of entitlement to reduce the 
polycentricity when feasible201 and to rely on procedural innovations 
that allow litigants to participate in judicially supervised settlement 
negotiations aimed self-consciously at solving the polycentric 
planning and design problems that remain.202
196. For a discussion of how tort law governing the element of intent avoids 
polycentricity, see Henderson, Constitutive Dimensions, supra note 15, at 234-36.
197. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 9.3.4, at 739 (“Fashioning a remedy 
was most difficult, by far, in the area of school desegregation.”); see also id. § 9.3.4, 
at 738-745.
198. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte–Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 19 
(1971).
200. Cf. supra notes 50, 53 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 721-22, 752-53 (1974) 
(imposing significant limit on interdistrict busing).
202. For a description of how federal district courts delegate problem-
solving responsibilities in “structural reform litigation,” allowing the party-litigants 
to work out solutions extrajudicially, see Alvin K. Hellerstein, James A. Henderson, 
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Affirmative-action programs benefiting racial minorities are, 
from the perspectives developed here, significant sources of 
difficulties. Were the Supreme Court to apply a rigorous version of 
the strict scrutiny test in such cases, rejecting virtually all forms of 
affirmative action, polycentric problem solving would not be 
necessary.203 To date, only a minority of Justices have advocated 
such a relatively extreme position.204 When government regulators 
are transparent in their willingness to indulge in favoritism that 
benefits minorities, such as by establishing numerical quotas and set-
asides, the Court is likely to reject them straightaway.205 Over time, 
however, majorities of the Court have allowed regulators to rely on 
racial classifications less transparently—to use race as a relevant, 
unquantified consideration in efforts to achieve greater diversity in 
school admissions, government hiring decisions, and the like.206
From the perspective developed in this Article, these judicial 
responses are puzzling in that the Court rejects quantified, up-front 
racial preferences, which might seem to present reviewing courts 
with less polycentricity,207 and embraces unquantified, less formal 
racial preferences, which might seem to present more.208 Something 
like the following hypothetical scenario may explain what is 
happening. For a number of reasons, and quite apart from whether it 
is substantively justified, affirmative action aimed at achieving racial 
diversity in academic admissions is awkwardly embarrassing for 
Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Managerial Judging: The 9/11 Responders’ Tort Litigation,
98 CORNELL L. REV. 127, 164-65 (2012).
203. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-66 (1990), 
overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
204. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 9.3.5.1, at 753-55.
205. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 288-289, 
290-91 (1978); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 273, 275 (2003).
206. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315, 343 (2003).
207. Certainly the question of whether specific standards have been followed 
would present essentially unicentric quantification problems. The question of 
whether the standards, themselves, are reasonable would be worked out 
incrementally, over time. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
208. The premise here is, of course, that the Court will actually undertake to 
review the reasonableness of the administrators’ admissions decisions—whether 
race played an appropriate role interdependently in relation to all the other factors 
taken into consideration. The author doubts that such a review does, or ever will, 
take place. See infra note 211 and accompanying text. But if judicial review occurs 
under an open-ended reasonableness standard, the Court will confront highly 
polycentric problems. 
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those involved.209 Quantified racial preferences, because they are 
transparently obvious, are especially so. With the Court refusing to 
apply a strict version of strict scrutiny in such instances, the current 
case law allows the Court to express its uneasiness by striking down 
stark examples of affirmative action—quotas and set-asides—while 
deferring virtually entirely to the discretion of admissions officers 
and hiring authorities to apply the unquantified, one factor among 
many approach beneath the radar of judicial review, as it were. That 
this may be what is taking place is supported circumstantially by the 
fact that the Court’s opinion in the leading case embracing the one 
factor among many approach does not even raise the question of how 
courts might effectively review specific applications of that approach 
in particular instances.210 Consistent with this admittedly speculative 
hypothesis, the author assumes that the Court will defer virtually 
completely to admissions committees in such cases, thereby avoiding 
the polycentric task of reviewing the reasonableness of admissions 
decisions.211
209. Affirmative action as a means of redressing past discrimination is 
arguably different in this regard. See infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text. But 
even if one assumes that affirmative action aimed at compensating for past 
discrimination preserves a plausible aura of dignity, parallel initiatives aimed at 
achieving racial diversity in admissions do not. In the words of Justice Thomas, 
concurring in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v Pena, “benign prejudice is just as 
noxious as . . . malicious prejudice. In each instance, it is racial discrimination, plain 
and simple.” 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). The point here is 
not that Justice Thomas’s conclusion—that affirmative action should fail under strict 
scrutiny—is necessarily correct. Even if one believes that affirmative action 
initiatives are justified, there is enough awkward truth to what Justice Thomas says 
in the quote to embarrass those who believe, however sincerely, that “benign 
prejudice” is an appropriate social response. Id. When one adds the plausible 
observation that such benign prejudice stigmatizes even those minority students who 
would have been admitted on their academic merit, the assertion in the text is 
warranted.
210. The major focus of the majority’s attention in Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327-
28, the leading affirmative action/diversity decision, is on the Michigan Law 
School’s protracted efforts to discover a better, more transparent method for 
achieving racial diversity in their student body. At no point does the Court attempt 
to review the law school’s application of its plan for unquantified racial favoritism 
to the facts of the particular case. 
211. In addition to the reality that meaningful review in the absence of a 
formal record would be all but impossible, the majority opinion in Grutter contains 
abundant language supporting the conclusion of judicial deferral to school 
administrators. See id. at 329 (finding that the law school’s good faith is “presumed” 
in “absence of a showing to the contrary” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 
333 (finding that the law school’s decisions were based on its “experience and 
expertise”); id. at 343 (“We take the [l]aw [s]chool at its word . . . .”).
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Another line of Supreme Court decisions allows regulators to 
take racial considerations into account when such considerations are 
reflected in narrowly drawn measures aimed not at achieving 
diversity but at compensating for past discrimination in particular 
contexts.212 Unless adequately specific doctrinal guideposts are in 
place, a trial court faces polycentric problems, and litigants’ 
opportunities to participate are correspondingly diminished, in 
determining how an affirmative action initiative compensating 
minority plaintiffs may reasonably be expected to remedy past 
wrongs to others.213 Despite attempts by concurring and dissenting 
Justices to develop specific criteria by which to determine when 
informally applied remedial measures are permissible, these cases 
remain problematic.214 The analysis in this Article predicts, to quote 
the poet, “the centre [cannot] hold.”215 Either the Court will insist on 
greater guidance via rule-specificity from both regulators and 
plaintiffs, or the Court will retreat to a strict version of strict scrutiny, 
as it has in rejecting racial quotas and set-asides.216
A recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, touching directly 
on the process concerns raised in this Article, suggests that the future 
trend will be in the direction of applying strict scrutiny.217 The case 
involved racial preferences in the context of college admissions. The 
basic issue on review from the Sixth Circuit218 was whether the State 
of Michigan could, by amending its constitution, abolish all forms of 
regulative discrimination based on race or gender.219 Except for the 
212. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491-92 (1980); United 
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1987).
213. In response to these potential difficulties, Justice Powell proposes a 
more specific, four-factor polycentricity-minimizing test in his concurrence in 
Fullilove. 448 U.S. at 510-11 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Stevens dissented in 
Fullilove, insisting that if Congress intends to discriminate in order to remedy past 
wrongs, it should make that intent clear by identifying the characteristics that justify 
the special treatment. Id. at 533-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 9.3.5.2, at 757-58.
215. See William Butler Yeats, Ten Poems: The Second Coming, DIAL, Nov. 
1920, at 466.
216. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 9.3.5.3, at 761-64; cf. supra note 205
and accompanying text.
217. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & 
Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 
1663 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
218. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant 
Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary v. Regents of the Univ. of 
Mich., 701 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1623. 
219. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1628.
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fact that the University of Michigan had already adopted an 
affirmative action admissions policy, of which the Supreme Court 
had explicitly approved,220 the constitutional amendment hardly 
seems controversial. After all, on its face it appears to be an accurate 
statement of the equality principle. Judged in context, however, the 
amendment could be characterized as depriving minorities of 
advantages previously granted to them by the University. The court 
of appeals set aside the amendment as violating equal protection, 
holding that earlier Supreme Court decisions221 imposed a two-
pronged test that forced the conclusion that the Michigan 
constitutional amendment “has a racial focus, targeting a policy or 
program that ‘inures primarily to the benefit of the minority’; and . . . 
reallocates political power or reorders the decisionmaking process in 
a way that places special burdens on a minority group’s ability to 
achieve its goals through that process.”222
It will be observed that the test embraced by the majority of the 
court of appeals is questionable from this Article’s perspective 
because it presents the many-centered problem of judging the 
reasonableness of basic governmental design.223 As in other contexts 
considered thus far, the point here is not that the test applied by the 
court of appeals is necessarily wrong on the substantive merits; 
assessed politically it may suffice as an abstract summary of what is 
objectionable about the Michigan constitutional amendment. Rather, 
the point is that the test presents problems sufficiently polycentric as 
to significantly reduce party-litigants’ opportunities to participate 
meaningfully in the judicial-review process.224
In any event, the Supreme Court split six to two (with one 
abstention) in favor of refusing to apply the court of appeals’ test and 
220. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
221. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969); Washington v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467, 472 (1982).
222. See Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 477 (quoting 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 472).
223. See supra notes 23, 48-53 and accompanying text. 
224. The second part of the test is the more troublesome. The concept of 
special burdens is the key. See Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 
477. If the modifier “special” means “any” burdens, the test will strike down 
virtually every measure that impacts minorities negatively and will not present 
polycentric problems for the court. And likewise if “special” means “crushing” 
burdens, no measure is likely to meet that test. Cf. supra note 189 and 
accompanying text. But the modifier “special” is almost certainly code for 
“unreasonable,” in which case the issues presented in this version of the “middle 
ground” will be highly polycentric. Cf. supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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upholding the Michigan constitutional amendment abolishing 
government-imposed affirmative action initiatives. Justice Kennedy 
wrote the plurality opinion, joined by two other Justices; as this 
Article’s analysis might have predicted, he emphasizes the lack of 
“clear legal standards or accepted sources to guide judicial decision” 
under the two-pronged test proposed by the minority plaintiffs.225
Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence in which he rejects the test 
applied below as unadministrable and insists that actual intent to 
discriminate must be shown in order to set aside a “no affirmative 
action” regulation on equal protection grounds.226 Justice Sotomayor 
authored a dissent in which she criticizes the plurality and Justice 
Scalia for relying on lack of administrability as one of the grounds 
for rejecting the court of appeals’ test for legality.227 In her opinion, 
the issues presented by that test are simply issues of fact that are 
inherently no different from, nor more difficult than, any other issues 
of fact, including the issue of actual intent that Justice Scalia 
concedes could supply an appropriate basis for determining the 
legality of regulations abolishing affirmative action programs. 
Of course, what Justice Sotomayor entirely overlooks is the 
reality that what she considers to be generic issues of fact are most 
certainly not all alike with respect to their many-centeredness and 
thus their manageability. The essentially evaluative issues under the 
test that Justice Sotomayor embraces are highly polycentric and thus 
do not lend themselves to litigant participation or judicial 
resolution;228 whereas the issue of regulators’ intent upon which 
Justice Scalia would rely is of the more-versus-less, unicentric sort 
that classically lends itself to being resolved via adjudication.229
Thus, whatever one’s view regarding the substantive merits of the 
central issue before the Court,230 the plurality and Justice Scalia are 
clearly correct in their assessments of the unadministrability of the 
test applied by the court of appeals, and Justice Sotomayor is just as 
clearly in error. Relative administrability does not automatically win 
225. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & 
Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623,
1635 (2014) (plurality opinion).
226. See id. at 1643, 1647-48 (Scalia, J., concurring).
227. See id. at 1675 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
228. Supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
230. Supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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the day;231 but the substantive rule that Justice Sotomayor endorses is 
not nearly so routinely easy to implement as she makes it out. 
E. The Relative Unmanageability of Middle-Ground Intermediate 
Scrutiny Review
The preceding discussions of rational basis and strict scrutiny 
review show how, as with the extremes of strict immunity and strict 
liability in tort, federal courts avoid highly polycentric problems that 
threaten to deny party-litigants their opportunities to participate 
meaningfully in the review process. Here, in connection with gender-
based classifications to which intermediate scrutiny attaches, 
attention turns to the question of how federal courts have managed to 
occupy the middle ground—how, to extend the tort analogy, courts 
have coped with a reasonableness-based, negligence-like standard of 
review.232 That the Supreme Court has no realistic choice but to try to 
occupy this middle ground is clear upon brief reflection. Quite 
simply, neither of the polar extremes generates acceptable outcomes 
in this context. To apply a rational basis test, tantamount to 
governmental strict immunity, would be under inclusive because 
relying on role stereotypes to discriminate against either gender is 
clearly inappropriate.233 Equally clearly, to apply strict scrutiny, 
analogous to governmental strict liability, would be over inclusive.234
Thus, unlike race-based classification, from a substantive 
perspective, gender-based classification is Janus-like.235 It has an 
antisocial face that must be rejected on equal protection principles.236
But it also has a benign face that, in some contexts, appropriately 
231. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
232. Cf. supra note 190 and accompanying text. For a defense of judicial 
recognition of “a legal middle ground between logically coherent alternatives” in the 
context of racial gerrymandering and affirmative action, in which the alternative 
extremes are colorblindness and unabashed racial preferencing, see Richard H. 
Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting 
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 483, 504 (1993).
233. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 9.4.3, at 780-84.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 191-92.
235. Except for affirmative action initiatives that may be justified because on 
balance they help minorities, no benign reasons exist for treating individuals 
differently based on their race, national origin, or alienage. See Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978).
236. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
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distinguishes between the sexes in ways that sensibly reflect the fact 
that men and women are fundamentally different.237
Faced with the dilemma of accommodating both of these valid 
substantive perspectives, the Supreme Court might have followed 
one of two paths. First, the Court might have modified the strict 
scrutiny test by relaxing the operative language. “Necessary to 
achieve a compelling government purpose”238 might have been 
become “helpful in serving a valuable governmental purpose,” 
thereby providing greater leeway for courts to accommodate a 
somewhat larger number of gender-based classifications.239 Or 
second, the Court might have divided gender classifications into two 
formal subcategories—for example, those that are, and those that are 
not, based on role stereotypes240—applying strict scrutiny to the 
former and rational basis to the latter.241 Under the first of these 
possible approaches—relaxing the standard of review—the problem 
solving would occur case-by-case as courts applied the vague general 
standard in efforts to link gender-based classifications to legitimate 
government purposes. Under the second possible approach, problem 
solving would occur at the rule-making stage, with courts giving 
formal meaning to the pivotal concept of role stereotypes.
For better or worse, the Supreme Court appears to have chosen 
the first of these paths by which to traverse the middle ground of 
gender discrimination. Under the Court’s “intermediate scrutiny” 
test, a regulatory classification based on gender is unconstitutional 
unless the government proves that it is “substantially related” to an 
“important” government purpose.242 As suggested earlier, this test 
may appear, on first encounter, to function as a slightly relaxed 
237. Gender-based segregation for purpose of sports competition, or public 
bathroom facilities, is appropriate on the same “‘separate but equal’” basis that 
would be unacceptable for similar segregations based on race. See CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 1, § 9.3.3.1, at 718-26 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 
(1954)).
238. See supra text accompanying note 161.
239. One might conceive the different modifiers as marking different places 
on a sliding-scale continuum between “allowing most classifications” to “allowing 
almost no classifications.” Strict scrutiny would allow almost no gender-based 
classifications; “helpful to serving a valuable purpose” would allow somewhat more 
but still reject a majority of such classifications; and so on.
240. Gender-based role stereotypes are close to the heart of what is troubling 
about gender classifications. See supra note 233 and accompanying text. The 
important point is that the pivotal concept would not present polycentric problems.
241. Neither of these levels of scrutiny present polycentric problems. See 
supra text preceding note 189.
242. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (emphasis added).
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version of the strict scrutiny test. On this view, intermediate scrutiny 
would presumably allow, compared with strict scrutiny, a marginally 
greater number of gender-based classifications to pass constitutional 
muster. However, from a process perspective, the superficially small 
adjustment in language produces a huge difference in outcomes. As 
explained earlier in connection with strict scrutiny, the operative 
modifiers in the context of racial discrimination are sufficiently 
extreme to support narrow applications that all but seal the doom of 
any regulatory classification that works to the disadvantage of a 
racial minority.243 Thus, aside from the special circumstance of 
affirmative action, strict-scrutiny leaves no room for the government 
to defend instances of racial discrimination. By contrast, once the 
intermediate standard of review is expanded to allow more than the 
smallest sliver of exceptions, the standard’s gatekeeping capacity 
collapses, leaving courts to work out solutions on a fact-sensitive, 
case-by-case basis.244 When the solutions depend on value 
judgments, as the phrase “important purpose” suggests, the problems 
presented are likely to be highly polycentric.245 Justice Rehnquist 
probably foresaw these developments when, in a dissent in the 
decision that established the intermediate scrutiny test in the first 
instance, he described the modifiers in the intermediate scrutiny test 
as “diaphanous” and “elastic.”246
243. The modifiers “necessary” and “compelling” in connection with strict 
scrutiny are sufficient, when supplemented by sub-rules in connection with 
affirmative action, to allow courts to hold the fort and allow only a sliver of 
exceptional claims. See supra text accompanying notes 191-92. This sort of reliance 
on extreme modifiers serves the same gatekeeping, polycentricity-reducing 
functions in tort law. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the 
Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 468, 514 n.175 
(1976) (noting that the rule allowing recovery for intentional infliction of mental 
suffering requires “extreme and outrageous conduct,” causing “severe emotional 
distress”).
244. Extreme modifiers serve effectively as gatekeepers in connection with 
open-ended problems because of their extremeness. See supra note 243 and 
accompanying text. Nonextreme modifiers require, in their application, 
consideration of a number of relevant variables, thereby presenting the underlying 
polycentric problems. Cf. supra note 153 and accompanying text. The concept of 
equality, as such, requires consideration of relevant variables in determining whether 
actors are truly “alike.” See Westen, supra note 154, at 543.
245. The same thing is true of strict scrutiny’s “compelling government 
purpose.” By contrast, if the sliding scale referred to supra note 239 were expressed 
in a single metric such as degrees centigrade, deciding where “somewhat hot” falls 
on the scale would be a unicentric, qualification problem. See supra text following 
note 24.
246. Craig, 429 U.S. at 221.
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Whatever Justice Rehnquist may have intended by his skeptical 
assessment of intermediate scrutiny, evidence suggests that the 
federal courts are confronting potentially complex, many-centered 
problems in gender cases and that the intermediate scrutiny approach 
is not providing an adequate doctrinal framework. Justice Brennan 
commented on this state of relative disarray and expressed regret that 
members of the Court were “splintered” regarding the proper path to 
take.247 It is also telling that, while Supreme Court opinions have
reiterated that the intermediate scrutiny test applies in cases 
involving gender-based classification,248 the Court has decided a 
number of gender cases during the same time period without 
ostensibly relying on that test.249 Consistent with the alternative 
approach suggested earlier, many of these decisions focus on 
whether or not the classifications in question rest on outmoded 
stereotypes regarding the roles played by men and women in 
workplace and family settings.250 That the Supreme Court’s 
rhetorical commitment to intermediate scrutiny is on shaky ground is 
suggested by a decision that held unconstitutional the Virginia 
Military Institute’s exclusion of women cadets.251 Justice Ginsburg 
explained that, while the test was intermediate scrutiny, defenders of 
gender-based classifications reflecting role stereotypes “must 
demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that action. 
. . . The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely 
[with] the [s]tate.”252 Given the forcefulness of this language, it is 
hardly surprising that strong minorities of the Court over the years 
have favored a strict scrutiny approach to gender classification 
claims253 and that some of the Justices who have favored retention of 
intermediate scrutiny may have done so out of concern that a strict 
scrutiny approach would jeopardize the prospects for women 
becoming the beneficiaries of gender-based affirmative action.254
Given that the current state of affairs regarding gender-based 
classifications is troublesome from the perspective advanced in this 
247. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 488 (1981) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
248. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 9.4.1, at 775 & n.44.
249. Id. § 9.4.1, at 775 & nn.49-50.
250. Id. § 9.4.3, at 780-86.
251. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 546 (1996).
252. Id. at 531, 533.
253. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (agreeing 
Justices included Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and White).
254. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 9.4.1, at 777 & n.57.
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Article, what might constitute more workable alternatives? As 
suggested earlier, one such alternative might be for the Court to 
divide gender classifications into two formal subcategories 
depending on whether or not they rest on traditional role stereotypes. 
For classifications that reflect stereotypes, strict scrutiny would 
apply. For those that do not, rational basis would be appropriate. 
Neither level of scrutiny would present highly polycentric 
problems.255 Deciding whether a given classification reflects 
stereotypes might often be difficult;256 but the problems presented 
would be essentially unicentric, not polycentric, and would allow for 
meaningful party-litigant participation.257 Regarding gender-based 
affirmative action initiatives, the key from this Article’s perspective 
would be whether the Court could develop an approach, perhaps 
along the lines of race-based remedial initiatives, that would not 
present courts with many-centered coordination problems.258 Once 
again, this analysis does not argue based on first principles that these 
proposals should necessarily be implemented.259 The analysis does 
suggest, however, that current gender discrimination law leaves a 
great deal to the discretion of law-appliers and to that extent denies 
party-litigants their promised opportunities to participate 
meaningfully in the process of judicial review. 
CONCLUSION
Meaningful participation by party-litigants lies at the core of 
adjudication. American judges know this, although often, when they 
encounter impediments to party-litigant participation, they refer to 
the limits of their own institutional capacities to solve complex social 
coordination problems. When judges talk this way they may, of 
course, be invoking the substantive principle that courts should not 
intrude too far into the political prerogatives of the other branches. 
Or judges may be referring to what might be deemed courts’ 
“mechanical” limitations, including their incapacity to collect and 
255. See supra text preceding note 189.
256. Such stereotypes are forms of historical, customary categorization. 
Evidence on both sides would often be conflicting and potentially confusing.
257. Whether an alleged stereotype exists and whether the classification 
reflects the stereotype are essentially more-versus-less, quantification problems, the 
elements of which are additive and subtractive, not mutually interdependent.
258. See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
259. Cf. supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
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process large quantities of data on broad social issues.260 However, as 
this analysis makes clear, meaningful party-litigant participation 
extends further and necessarily involves opportunities for litigants 
not only to prove facts, but also to participate in the decision process 
by taking courts through linear chains of logic to favorable outcomes 
upon which they may insist as a matter of right. Complex polycentric 
problems that must be solved under vague reasonableness standards 
present major impediments to such participation. When such 
impediments are present, courts necessarily reach outcomes through 
the exercise of broad discretion and party-litigants, having made 
their proofs, are reduced to the functional equivalents of supplicants, 
begging for judicial empathy.
The requirements of justiciability and the different levels of 
scrutiny help courts to avoid the sorts of many-centered design 
problems that threaten party-litigants’ opportunities to participate in 
judicial review. Justiciability categorically excludes open-ended, 
highly polycentric problems, including requests for abstract, 
noncontextual advisory opinions and answers to political questions. 
And the different levels of scrutiny in equal protection-based review 
identify relevant categories of regulatory classification and apply 
correspondingly different types and intensities of judicial review 
that, with notable exceptions in areas such as affirmative action and 
gender-based discrimination, reduce the many-centeredness of 
claims that do reach court. For all the scholarly attention these 
doctrines have received, virtually no one has addressed the issues 
raised in this analysis.
To the extent that the observations in this Article are accurate 
and the analysis is sound, what is to be made of them? As indicated 
from the outset, this analysis is mainly descriptive. No claim is made 
that first principles require the American system to make these 
commitments to party-litigant participation or to adopt these methods 
of preserving and promoting that participation. However, given the 
system’s de facto commitments to meaningful party-litigant 
participation, one ought to take them into account when prescribing 
what should be taking place in the substantive areas included in this 
analysis. Thus, if one were to urge, as some critics have urged, the 
abandonment of one or more of the justiciability doctrines, or to urge 
that the Supreme Court adopt a more flexible, intuition-based, 
“[c]ourts will know it when they see it” approach261 in a controversial 
260. See supra note 97.
261. Cf. supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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area of equal protection, one should be expected to take into account 
the realities described in this Article.

